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Public health systems research is a growing area of inquiry about effectiveness in 
public health practice in the U.S.  The public health system is poorly understood, in part 
because there is enormous heterogeneity among local health departments in financing, 
organization and the provision of services.  The emphasis on such variation, however, 
may have inadvertently limited our progress in creating a fundamental knowledge base 
about our public health system.  This dissertation research acknowledges and affirms the 
variation in the public health system.  At the same time it endeavors to increase 
understanding about how local public health officials set priorities and whether there is a 
valuable role for the public in allocation decision making. 
The three papers that make up this dissertation are broadly situated in the ethical 
and political theories of distributive justice, stewardship and democratic deliberation.  
The practical distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with public health 
actions is guided by competing conceptions of equality, maximization and helping the 
least advantaged.  Issues of equity and fairness in apportioning public health resources 
cannot be resolved through science and laws alone, but require normative judgments.  As 
stewards of public health resources, local health officials are trusted to make these 
judgments and to be efficient and fair in their decision making.  They must decide which 
programs to run and therefore which population groups to serve, but they must do so 
within the constraints of inadequate infrastructure and rigid revenue streams.  They must 
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also manage periodic scarcity of important resources and address public concerns for 
fairness. 
Deliberative procedures are hailed as egalitarian methods for involving the public 
in decision making activities about issues that directly affect them.  They are expected to 
increase transparency in policy processes and provide policy makers with information 
about the issues that concern citizens.  The public health community is just beginning to 
assess the value of these procedures in areas like pandemic preparedness and response.   
These theories are applied in two separate but related studies that make up the 
three papers included in this dissertation.  The first is a national survey of local health 
officials.  We assess the types of allocation decisions officials make and the factors that 
influence those decisions, and we explore the role of bureaucratic discretion in 
apportioning resources.  The second is a series of focus group sessions with members of 
the public.  We analyze their deliberations about value-laden policy decisions related to 
pandemic preparedness and response. 
 My first paper is entitled, “Resource Allocation in Public Health Practice: A 
National Survey of Local Public Health Officials.”  Little prior research has characterized 
priority-setting activities in public health.   We designed and executed a survey to gain an 
empirical understanding of the types of decisions local health officials make and their 
insights into what influences those decisions.  We also employed new survey data from 
the National Association of County and City Health Officials which give context to our 
survey data so that we can compare allocation decisions by governance structure and by 
the size of the population served by the local health department.  The particular 
contribution of this study is a clearer understanding of the ways that local health officials 
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fulfill their obligations as stewards of public health resources.  Again, variation is a clear 
theme in allocation (as it is in so many issues) in local public health.  At the same time 
there is also consistency among most officials in the way they value the effectiveness of 
the activities and services they offer and take seriously their department‟s role as sole 
providers of certain services in their communities.  The study shows that allocation 
decisions are most often made without the benefit of data from needs assessments and 
that staffing shortages are the norm for nearly 40% of local health departments.  Officials 
report little shifting of resources among population groups, and only minimal direct 
public input in the allocation process. 
In my second paper, titled “The Role of Discretion in the Resource Allocation 
Decisions of Local Public Health Officials,” I focus on the flexibility and control that 
officials report in allocating revenues and personnel effort.  This particular focus was 
motivated by interviews in a separate study with local health officials in Michigan who 
faced ethical challenges in their allocation decisions and expressed their desire to be able 
to do more with the revenues already available to them.   
Our findings add to the public administration and public health practice 
literatures, reporting three new measures of discretion.  Local health officials report the 
ability to reallocate nearly one-third of all revenues at their discretion, and even higher 
levels of flexibility in reallocating their personnel time and effort, to better meet the 
needs of their communities.  We identify an association between levels of discretion and 
per capita expenditures, moderated by the presence of a Board of Health.  Our models do 
not show, however, a significant association between levels of discretion and the 
proportion of revenues attributed to local sources, contrary to our hypothesis.  We also 
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report a positive association between each of the three measures of discretion and a 
constructed measure of the proportion of needs that are satisfied for ten public health 
activities and services. 
My third paper, entitled “Ethical Issues in Pandemic Preparedness and Response: 
Focus Groups for Public Engagement,” synthesizes the findings from a pilot study in 
community engagement that was conducted prior to the declaration of the current H1N1 
pandemic.  Two unique contributions of this study are: 1) the application of deliberative 
methods to ethically-laden policy decisions in public health; and 2) the analysis of public 
attitudes and concerns about the allocation of scarce resources and the burdens of 
proposed sustained social distancing measures during a pandemic.   
Democratic deliberation is a method with a great deal of theoretical support and 
little empirical backing.  We found that our participants showed a capacity for 
deliberation with a brief education session and a facilitated discussion.  They anticipated 
serious economic and emotional burdens associated with proposed social distancing 
measures, and they voiced a deep distrust of government in the fair allocation of 
resources and in the timely distribution of necessary health information to the public.  
Our participants shared a clear desire for education and opportunities for public input in 
the policy process.   
  Through qualitative and quantitative research methods, these studies contribute 
to the public health systems research goals of building an empirical basis for 







Resource Allocation in Public Health Practice: 
A National Survey of Local Public Health Officials 
 
The current system for providing local public health services in the U.S. is 
complex and widely varied in terms of financing, organization and the provision of 
services (NACCHO, 2009; Mays, 2008; Mays et al., 2006; Wall, 1998).  Recent public 
health systems research by Mays and Smith sheds new light on the magnitude of this 
variation.  They found that per capita spending on public health services varied by a 
factor of more than 13 between local health departments (LHDs) in the highest and 
lowest expenditure groups, with most variation remaining even after controlling for 
differences in services and population demographics.  This far exceeded the well 
documented variation in spending in the rest of the health care system (Mays and Smith, 
2009).  In the midst of such uneven spending for public health services, local public 
health officials (LHOs) are challenged to effectively and equitably meet their 
communities‟ needs for disease prevention, containment and treatment.  They must make 
resource allocation decisions that determine which activities and services their 
departments offer and which population groups will benefit.  There is little in the 
literature describing such allocation processes and their justifications in public health 
practice.  What types of allocation decisions do LHOs make?   What processes do they 
use in decision-making?  What factors influence LHOs‟ allocation decisions?  In this 
study we addressed these questions using data from a nationally representative survey of 
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LHOs, analyzed in the context of new data about the characteristics of LHDs in the U.S. 
from the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). 
 
Background 
Resource allocation decisions are central to public health systems operations, yet 
little empirical research has characterized the nature and scope of allocation decisions 
confronted by the officials running LHDs.  When allocation by public administrators is 
assessed, the process is generally described as informal and ad hoc, lacking in the 
application of formal decision analyses.  In his work describing resource allocation in the 
public sector as a whole, C.M. Fischer suggests that public administrators develop beliefs 
and sets of values that are then applied heuristically to guide allocation decisions.  These 
heuristics are “mental rules of thumb” that help administrators navigate the complex 
process of setting priorities (Fisher, 1998, p.26).  Fischer groups the values used by 
administrators in allocation decisions into six categories, including deservingness, 
individual need, fairness, utility, ecology (i.e., decisions should consider stakeholder 
concerns), and personal gain and competence.  He suggests that, although such informal 
methods are certainly flawed, if balanced with conceptions of collaboration, control (e.g., 
between market forces and population needs) and competence, they can move allocation 
decisions in the direction of the common good (Fisher, 1998). 
Informal approaches to allocation decisions may be used, in part, because of the 
enormous variation both in the way LHDs are funded and governed and in public health 
needs in communities.  Additionally, often there is simply no broad agreement among 
policy makers on public health priorities.  Certainly economists and others have 
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developed less subjective, more explicit or technically optimal approaches to setting 
priorities by applying techniques such as cost-effectiveness analyses, yet it is not clear if 
many public health practitioners use economic analyses, decision frameworks or other 
formal tools in allocation decisions (Neumann and Jacobson, 2008; Neumann et al., 
2008; Neumann, 2004).   
In spite of the ad hoc or informal approaches, LHOs strive to make the best 
allocation decisions for their communities.  In an interview study of ethical issues faced 
by public health practitioners in Michigan, resource allocation decisions constituted a 
prominent theme.  Practitioners struggled to set priorities for allocation of funds and 
personnel among public health programs, oversaw vaccine allocation during shortages, 
and anticipated scarcity during disaster preparedness planning.  One LHO shared the 
following view of allocation decision making: 
“…we are ethically responsible to the people of this community to address the 
most pressing health issues I think, and address those to the best of our ability.  And 
certainly an aspect of providing that service is deciding where…the dollars go.”   (Baum, 
et al., 2009). 
 
Local health officials are a significant source of knowledge about public health 
practice.  Practically, they have a major role in determining which services and activities 
are provided in a community.  Philosophically, as stewards of public resources and public 
trust, LHOs are obligated to make efficient and just decisions for their communities and 
are expected to help fulfill broader societal concerns for fairness and equity. 
Stewardship is identified by the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
numerous scholars as one of the core functions of managers in any health system.  
Theories of public stewardship emphasize collectivism and community trust in officials 
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to both efficiently and ethically serve the public‟s interest.  In 2000, WHO defined 
stewardship broadly as the “…careful and responsible management of the well-being of 
the population” under the guise of “good government” (WHO, 2000, p.136).   
Stewardship means influencing policies so that all members of a community are valued, 
as well as providing vision and direction in a health care system.  When public officials 
act as good stewards, citizens see their actions as legitimate, and they trust that officials 
will act in ways that are beneficial to the communities that they govern and will allocate 
resources effectively (Nuffield Council, 2006; Travis et al., 2002; WHO, 2000; Saltzman 
and Ferroussier-Davis, 2000; Murray and Frenk, 2000; Kass, 1990).  
Murray and Frenk explicitly list priority setting as one of the main functions of 
stewardship, along with regulation, advocacy, consumer protection, performance 
assessment and overall system design (2000).   A fair and just distribution of benefits and 
burdens is essential to public health priority setting processes.  Various conceptions of 
justice (e.g., egalitarian or utilitarian approaches) may offer some guidance for public 
stewards to ensure fair allocation of limited public health resources.  Although 
distributive theories of justice have been well considered in the health care literature, no 
one theory consistently guides priority setting procedures in public health (Daniels, 
2001).  Even social justice and utilitarianism, often referred to as hallmark principles of 
public health, are not consistently used to guide allocation or other ethical decision 
making in public health practice (Baum et al., 2009; Gostin and Powers, 2006; Turnock, 
2004; Nord, 1999; Krieger and Brin, 1998; Levy, 1998).  
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This study contributes to the literature by collecting primary data to create a fuller 
description of the allocation decisions made by LHOs, in the context of new data on 




We designed and conducted a national survey of LHOs in the U.S. in 2008-2009.   
The sampling frame was a list, maintained by NACCHO, of all local health departments 
(members, non-members and inactive members of NACCHO), including names and 
contact information for 2820 local health officials.   
 
Survey design.  After a thorough review of the literature on resource allocation in 
public health practice, we consulted with two survey methodologists to design the survey 
instrument.  Questions addressed four broad domains, including: 1) the nature and scope 
of resource allocation decisions officials confront; 2) the processes officials use when 
they make allocation decisions; 3) the degree of discretion officials report in allocating 
resources; and, 4) whether communities‟ public health needs are met for ten public health 
services.
1
  We did not include questions on topics expected to be included in NACCHO‟s 
2008 National Profile of Local Health Departments (Profile), such as funding sources, 
governance structure, and expenditures. [See Appendix 2.B for the Survey Instrument] 
  Once the questionnaire was drafted, we conducted cognitive interviewing with 
five recently retired local public health officials to assess whether they understood the 
draft survey questions in the way we intended, and whether they provided adequate 
answer choices (Willis, 2005).  Each interview was conducted via telephone, lasted 
                                                 
1
 Data from domains 1 and 2 are discussed in this paper.  Data from domains 3 and 4 will be discussed in 
another paper focusing on the question of LHOs‟ discretion in allocation decisions. 
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approximately one hour.  We paid each of the five participants  $20 as a token of 
appreciation for his time and modified questions based on participant responses.  A 
survey research firm then constructed and administered the final web-based 
questionnaire.  We pre-tested the web-based survey by sending email invitations to 50 
LHOs randomly selected within three strata (based on size of the population served by 
the LHD), proportional to the final sample.  Pre-tests also queried respondents about the 
length of time they spent completing the survey so that we could accurately predict in the 
e-mail invitations the length of time respondents would need to complete the survey.   
 Sample design and recruiting. Since the size of the population served by LHDs 
varies widely and is associated with many other attributes (e.g., types of services offered, 
types and sources of funds), we stratified the sampling frame by size (large ≥ 500,000, 
medium 50,000-499,999, small < 50,000).  We sampled officials from all large 
departments since they make up only six percent of all LHDs but deliver services to over 
50% of the total U.S. population.  Officials were randomly selected within the small and 
medium strata.  Our total final sample was n=1327 officials from 121 large, 577 medium 
and 629 small departments.   
In May, 2008 we recruited participants using an email invitation.  We did not 
promise participants confidentiality but did assure them that findings would be reported 
only in aggregate form.  Shortly before sending the email invitations, we emailed 
officials a letter from a nationally prominent local health official in which he encouraged 
his colleagues to complete our survey.   Survey incentives included a $15 Amazon gift 
card as a token of appreciation for time spent completing the survey, and a copy of the 
final survey report.   
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Since officials in states with centralized public health systems are often 
responsible for more than one LHD, some respondents were chosen more than once in 
our sample.  In those situations, we sent respondents a separate email invitation for each 
department selected, and specified the department in the invitation so that they could 
answer the survey with the selected department in mind.  We sent non-respondents one or 
two email reminders as the initial surges of responses dropped off.  We did not send 
reminders after mid-June, 2008 because we had agreed not to be actively recruiting 
participants while the NACCHO Profile study was in the field.
2
  After data collection for 
the Profile study ended, we sent paper surveys to non-respondents to our web-based 
survey in early December, 2008.  The invitation to complete the paper survey also 
included a web-link option to complete the survey on-line.  As an incentive to complete 
the paper survey, the invitation letter included a ten dollar Amazon gift card and a 
University of Michigan pencil (to entice officials to open the envelope).  One additional 
paper survey was sent to non-respondents when the initial surge of responses to the paper 
survey dropped off, and one final follow-up reminder letter was sent in March, 2009 to 
non-respondents. 
Paper survey data was entered into an Excel spreadsheet by one researcher 
(NMB) as completed surveys were received by mail.  Data from 25% of the paper 
surveys was again entered into a separate spreadsheet by a research assistant (CG) and 
compared to assess accuracy of data entry.   
This survey data was then linked with data from the 2008 Profile study.   The 
Profile was conducted by NACCHO between July and October, 2008, and is a survey of 
                                                 
2
 The NACCHO Profile study is a periodic survey of all local health departments.   The 2008 Profile was 
launched in mid-July and sent to all officials in our sampling frame. 
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all LHDs in the U.S. (n=2,794 in 2008).
3
  Profile questionnaires were designed to collect 
data on the structure, function and capacity of LHDs.  Overall, 83% of all LHDs 
(n=2332) responded to the Profile.  We merged Profile data with our data using a unique 
LHD identifier. 
Data analysis.  Responses to survey questions provide descriptive data for 
understanding resource allocation in public health practice.  Surveys returned by officials 
who indicated that they had been in their position less than one year (n=68) were omitted 
from the denominator when calculating response rates.  These surveys were omitted 
because we wanted officials to have experienced at least one complete annual budget 
cycle in their position to accurately respond to many of our survey questions.  Data from 
pre-testing was also excluded from analyses.  The proportion of missing data was 
assessed for each variable.  To assess whether data were missing systematically, we 
compared respondents with and without missing data on key variables (for future 
multivariate analyses).  Items missing at greater than 10% were assessed to determine 
whether there were patterns, using the mvpatterns command in STATA.  This command 
displays not only which responses are missing at which rates, but also aggregates missing 
data to display the numbers of respondents who omit each combination of missing 
responses.  A composite analytic weight was also constructed for each of the three strata 
to reduce bias in the sample estimates.   The weight adjusts for unequal probability of 
selection into the sample, differences in response rates, and stratification, to be consistent 
with the overall population of LHOs in the U.S. (Lee and Forthofer, 2006).  [See 
Appendix 2.1 for construction of analytic weights.]  Descriptive statistics were generated 
                                                 
3
 Geographically, both Hawaii and Rhode Island were excluded from the Profile because there are no sub-
state local health units.   
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without imputation.  All analyses were conducted using STATA 10.1 software, using the 
svy: command to correct for complex sampling designs. 
Descriptive statistics included mean, range and standard deviation for continuous 
variables and proportions and ranges for categorical variables, identification of outliers 
and examination of missing data.  Bivariate analyses included chi-square tests to 
determine relationships between categorical variables and between subgroups within 
categorical variables (for size categories), and simple regression for continuous variables.    
 This study was approved by the University of Michigan Medical School‟s 




The web and paper surveys combined included n= 685 responses from local 
public health officials, all of whom had been in their positions more than one year.  The 
overall response rate was 53%.  This rate varied somewhat by strata, with small 
departments responding at 50%, and medium and large responding at 55%.  After 
merging our survey data with the 2008 NACCHO Profile data, we had a final sample size 
of n= 608 LHOs.  By size of the population served, there were 258 respondents from 
small, 292 from medium, and 58 from large departments. 
Most data items were missing at rates less than 10%.  However, data on revenue 
sources were missing at rates of 15-26%, with data from small and medium LHDs 
missing at somewhat higher rates than large departments.  Data on LHO licensure was 
missing at rates of 14% for large LHDs, 13% for medium LHDs and 16% for small 
LHDs.  No other patterns were identified in the missing data.   
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Data were weighted for selection probability, survey response rate and 
stratification to reflect the full population of LHOs (Groves, et al, 2004).   
[See Appendix 2A for weights.]  
Local Health Official Demographics.  On average, our respondents were 53 
years old and had nearly ten years experience (median 7years) in their positions running 
LHDs.  Officials running small departments were more often white and female than those 
heading medium and large departments.  While just 2% of all departments were headed 
by African American officials, 11% of those running large departments identified 
themselves as African American.   
Local health officials reported varied levels of educational preparation.  Officials 
from small departments were significantly less likely to hold a masters or doctoral degree 
than officials in the other two strata.  While overall only 15% of all LHOs held a doctoral 
degree, 62% of those running large departments held a doctoral degree of some type.  
Large departments were far more likely to be run by physicians, while small departments 
were more likely to be run by registered nurses.  Medium sized departments were also 
significantly more likely to be run by environmental health specialists than were large 
departments.    
[See Table 2.1 for LHO Demographics.] 
Characteristics of Local Health Departments.  Governance of LHDs is often 
characterized as either centralized at the state level or decentralized at the local level.  
Eighty-six percent of our respondents ran departments that were governed locally (e.g., a 
local Board of Health or County Council has the authority to hire/fire the LHO) rather 
than by a state agency.   
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Of all LHDs, 79% had a Board of Health (BOH), and the proportion with a BOH 
decreased as size of the department increased.  Thirteen percent of all LHDs had 
members elected to their BOHs.  Others were appointed or designated by statute to serve 
based on an elected (e.g., county commissioner) or non-elected (e.g., school 
superintendent) position.  For nearly half of all departments, the BOH had the authority to 
approve the LHD budget.  County governments (e.g. county councils, commissioners, 
executives or boards of supervisors) also approved the budgets of half of LHDs.  City or 
state governments approved LHD budgets much less often.  Local BOHs usually did not 
have the authority to impose taxes for public health activities; this was most often a 
function of county or city government.  Boards of health generally were responsible for 
adopting public health regulations and setting regulatory and patient fees.  County 
government had the authority to request a public health levy for over half of departments, 
but BOHs had this authority for over a third of small departments.
4
 
The majority of respondents worked in departments with jurisdiction over just one 
county, seven percent over multiple counties, and one quarter over a city, town or 
city/county.  None of the departments in this survey had jurisdiction over an entire state.   
[See Table 2.2 for LHD Characteristics.] 
Revenues and Expenditures.   Local health departments drew revenues from a 
wide variety of sources.  The largest proportion of revenues (20%) for all LHDs came 
directly from states.  The second largest source of revenues (19%) came from counties, 
and federal money passed through states was the third largest source (17%).  When taken 
as a group, local revenue (county + city) was the largest source of funds, and this did not 
                                                 
4
 For governance questions (i.e., questions about authority to approve budgets, impose taxes, adopt 
regulations and set fees), respondents were encouraged to select all answers that applied from BOH/County 
government/City or Town government/ State agency/Other. 
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vary significantly by size.  Medicaid made up ten percent of revenues overall, but small 
departments received a significantly greater proportion of revenues from Medicaid than 
medium or large departments.  Regulatory fees, cities and other sources each provided 
about 7% of revenues.  Medicare accounted for five percent of total revenues, but again, 
small departments drew a significantly larger proportion of revenues from Medicare than 
did larger departments.  Patient fees, federal direct funds, private foundations, private 
insurance and tribal sources each made small contributions to LHD revenues. 
Although the largest sources of revenue did not vary greatly by size of the 
population served by the LHD, there were numerous significant differences when 
revenues were compared by governance structure (state v. local).  Revenues from states 
and from Medicaid made up much larger proportions of revenues for state governed 
LHDs, while county revenues and federal pass-through funds accounted for more 
revenues for locally governed departments.  Regulatory fees and revenues from city 
sources accounted for just one to two percent of revenues for state governed departments, 
but 8% each for those governed locally.  Revenues from patient fees, private foundations 
and private health insurance accounted for small proportions of revenues, but also varied 
by governance structure.  The only sources that did not differ significantly by governance 
category were Medicare, Federal direct funds, tribal and other sources.    
Median per capita expenditures were $36.10 for all LHDs in the most recently 
completed fiscal year.
5
  The larger the size of the population served by the department, 
the greater the per capita spending.  Departments governed at the local level had lower 
per capita expenditures than those governed at the state level.   
                                                 
5
 According to the NACCHO Profile report (2009), fiscal years for LHDs vary, with 36% ending December 




Types of Resource Allocation Decisions.  We asked respondents the extent to 
which  they shifted resources among population groups, added or eliminated the activities 
they offered and adjusted the funding to such activities.  Overall, 61% of LHOs reported 
shifting resources among population groups very little or not at all.  Officials in small 
departments reported even less shifting of resources than their counterparts from larger 
departments.   
We also asked respondents the extent to which they changed the way they 
allocated their own time, as well as that of their staff and contractors working for them.  
Seventy-eight percent said they had changed the way they allocated their own time to 
some extent or to a great extent.  A somewhat lower proportion changed the tasks that 
their staff performed, with 63% responding that they did so to some extent or to a great 
extent. Only 21% directed contractors to change their tasks to the same degree.   
Over half of all officials reported adding activities offered by their department to 
some extent or to a great extent.  In contrast, only 35% said they eliminated activities to 
the same degree, and small departments were significantly less likely to eliminate 
activities than medium sized departments.  When asked about funding changes, 46% of 
officials said they increased funds to one or more activities to some extent or to a great 
extent in the past year.  Similarly, 46% reported decreasing funds to one or more 
activities to the same degree, although small departments did so less than others.  None of 
the responses to these questions differed significantly by governance category (state vs. 
local). 
 [See Figure 2.1 for Types of Allocation Decisions.]   
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Compared to the year prior, the number of staffing full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
remained constant in 57% of small departments, but lower proportions of medium and 
large departments reported such constancy.  The level of change in staffing varied 
substantially by governance category, with FTEs in over half of locally governed 
departments remaining constant compared to 31% of those from state governed 
departments.  Only five percent of small departments reported that their allocation of 
FTEs changed greatly, compared to 8% of medium and 9% of large departments.   
Allocation decisions during an emergency.  Nearly one-third of respondents 
answered affirmatively to at least one question about managing resources during an 
actual emergency in the past year.  Twenty percent of all officials reported that they had 
to determine how to allocate funds during an emergency, and 14% faced the task of 
determining how to manage an expected shortage of both biological and non-biological 
resources.  A much larger proportion (28%) had to manage staffing shortages during an 
emergency.   
Allocation decisions during non-emergencies.  Even when not managing an 
emergency, seven percent of officials reported having to manage acute shortages of 
medications, with nearly one-third reporting that they managed shortages of vaccines.  
Overall, 39% of officials reported managing an acute shortage in their workforce, but this 
was less of a problem for small departments.  Officials in the more centralized, state-
governed LHDs reported having to manage shortages of vaccines and medications at 
higher proportions than those in locally governed departments.   
While planning for a future emergency, over 80% of officials made 
determinations about allocating disaster planning funds, and planned to manage a staffing 
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shortage.  Three quarters planned to manage a shortage of biological resources, but only 
14% planned to manage a shortage of non-biological resources such as beds or oxygen.   
Processes Used to Make Allocation Decisions.  We asked respondents about the 
frequency with  which they consulted staff and colleagues when making allocation 
decisions.  Overall, 83% of officials usually or always consulted their staff during 
allocation decision-making, but this was more common in large departments than in 
small ones.  Officials generally did less consulting with colleagues in other LHDs than 
with their own staff, but officials in small departments consulted such colleagues more 
frequently than those in medium and large departments.  It was less common for officials 
to consult colleagues at the state level, with only one-third reporting they usually or 
always took such action.  Just over half of all respondents usually or always consulted 
their BOHs or county councils when making allocation decisions, but this was more 
common for small departments than for large.   In addition, sixty-one percent of all 
respondents usually or always reviewed government guidelines for allocation.  Less than 
half, however, usually or always used economic analyses (e.g., cost-effectiveness 
analyses; program budgeting and marginal analysis) or conducted needs assessments.  
One-third of respondents reported usually or always using decision tools in the allocation 
decision process.  [See Figure 2.2 for Processes Used to Make Allocation Decisions.] 
Influential factors in allocation decisions. Of the fifteen factors presented to 
respondents, five were chosen by more than half as very influential when making 
resource allocation decisions.  They included: the effectiveness of the activity (64%), 
previous allocations (62%); being the sole provider of an activity in the community 
(61%); reluctance to lay off employees (56%); and influence from a BOH (53%).  Results 
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from decision tools, input from the public, colleagues in other departments, County 
Council, and a state health department were considered to be the least influential.  Factors 
seen as moderately influential included staff input, government guidelines for allocation, 
public expectations, results from economic analyses, and needs assessments. 
Factors of influence varied only slightly by strata and governance category.  
Officials from small departments reported greater influence from BOHs and colleagues 
than their counterparts in medium and large departments.  Officials from state-governed 
departments reported that decision-tools and input from the state health department were 
more influential than those governed locally.     
[See Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3 Influential Factors in Allocation Decisions.]  
 
Discussion 
As stewards of public resources and experts in the delivery of public health 
services, LHOs are challenged to allocate limited funds, staffing and other resources to 
meet the public health needs in their communities. It is clear from our findings that there 
is a great deal of variation both by size of department served and by governance structure 
in these allocation processes.  However, all officials reported little shifting of funds to 
address particular population needs, and shared factors that were influential in their 
allocation processes. 
We have long recognized that major differences exist among LHDs in the services 
and activities they provide, so it was not surprising to see variation in per capita 
expenditures among LHDs.  In particular, the level of clinic services provided varies 
greatly among departments, as does the amount of environmental health activity.  As the 
 
21 
NACCHO Profile report and others point out, differences in expenditures are associated 
with variation in community need for public health services, the extent to which 
environmental and clinic services are offered, as well as simply the variation in wealth 
and capacity of communities to generate local revenues and provide a range of services 
(NACCHO, 2009; Skutchfield and Keck, 2009).  In this sample, median per capita 
expenditures were greater for larger departments and for those with more centralized 
governance structure.  Larger departments likely have the capacity to deliver a wider 
range of public health services and activities than small departments, and departments 
governed at the state level may provide a higher level of clinical services (as evidenced 
by the significantly higher proportion of revenues from Medicaid) than those governed 
locally.  Clearly, further studies like that of Mays and Smith (2009) are needed to gain a 
deeper understanding of the sources of variation in per capita expenditures.   
It is also not surprising that sources of revenue varied by governance structure.  
Centralized public health systems do not have the same infrastructure at the city or 
county level that locally governed LHDs have to influence local leaders or to levy local 
funding for public health activity.  Similarly, locally governed departments do not have 
authority over state resources, and state authorities no doubt expect local governments to 
make significant revenue contributions to local public health. 
Officials reported little shifting of resources from one population group to 
another.   In contrast, they reported changing the ways they spent their own time, and 
redirected their staff, to a far greater extent than they shifted resources. While officials 
may not be able to shift funds because of categorical or other restrictions on funding 
sources, they may instead be able to emphasize different activities or services by 
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adjusting how they spend their own time and the tasks their staff perform.  An official 
may decide, for example, to keep a clinic open an extra half day per week, and may 
redirect nurses to staff that clinic in lieu of making home visits.  Such redirection would 
obviously be limited by staff skills, licensure, and other constraints, but may be an 
effective way to shift services among population groups when officials cannot directly 
divert funding.  It may spur more cross-training of staff for various roles, much like has 
happened in some LHDs as a result of increased demand for staff with emergency 
preparedness and response skills (Lurie et al., 2006).  Officials from small departments 
reported even less shifting of resources and redirecting of staff than their counterparts at 
larger departments.  This may be due to both lower funding levels (lower per capita 
expenditures) and less capacity within their staffing pool to perform a wide variety of 
tasks.  If there is no excess capacity, either in terms of funding or staffing, there may be 
little opportunity to make any adjustments at all.  Alternatively, the lack of flexibility in 
shifting resources reported here could, instead, indicate that there is little need for 
reallocation of funds among population groups, but given the enormous unmet need in 
most public health settings and little evidence of adequate resources, this explanation 
seems less likely. 
Our results demonstrate that resource allocation decisions are made 
collaboratively in most LHDs.  The vast majority of officials consult staff when setting 
priorities, and many reach out to colleagues in other LHDs and at the state level.  
Officials running small departments most often reported acting collaboratively with their 
peers from other LHDs and consulting the state-level staff, and consulted their BOHs for 
guidance or approval.  They may be more isolated professionally or may have fewer 
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resources at their fingertips than their colleagues.  Input from a BOH was reported as one 
of the most highly influential factors in allocation decisions.  Clearly governing authority 
for BOHs varies, but even those functioning only as advisory bodies are likely important 
sources of expertise, public views and perhaps support for difficult allocation decisions.   
While officials may gather valuable information from colleagues and governing 
authorities, well over half of all officials surveyed reported that they sometimes or never 
conduct needs assessments when making allocation decisions.  To be sure, needs 
assessments can be time consuming and expensive, and this alone likely explains our 
findings.  Yet assessment is one of the three core functions of public health as established 
by the Institute of Medicine (along with policy development and assurance), and is 
foundational for planning and priority setting activities (Turnock, 2004; Petersen and 
Alexander, 2001).  In extremely resource poor areas, needs assessments may appear to be 
of little value if officials know there are insufficient resources to treat the needs that are 
identified.  Ideally, however, LHOs would set priorities with complete and updated 
information about their communities‟ public health needs.   
Our findings reinforce conventional wisdom that it is generally harder to 
eliminate activities or services offered in a LHD than it is to add them.  This difficulty in 
eliminating activities was more pronounced for small departments than for medium or 
large LHDs.  It is likely that small departments find themselves to be the sole provider of 
certain services in their communities more often than larger departments.  If considered 
in light of our finding that being the sole provider of a service is one of the most 
influential factors in allocation decisions, it is clear that eliminating activities might be 
even more difficult for small LHDs. 
 
24 
Given the emphasis on emergency planning and response in public health practice 
in the past decade, most officials are, no doubt, well versed in their departments‟ plans 
for managing staff shortages and scarcity of vaccine during an infectious disease outbreak 
or other emergency.  Our findings suggest, however, that nearly 40% of LHOs must 
manage acute staffing shortages even when they are not under the pressures of a public 
health emergency.  This, too, is consistent with long-standing worries about inadequate 
funding in the public health system and the resultant inadequate capacity for meeting 
public health needs (IOM, 2003).  Acute staffing shortages greatly complicate not only 
the task of addressing everyday public health needs, but obviously also complicate the 
management of even greater staffing limits expected during many types of  public health 
emergencies.  In a field as labor intensive as public health practice, emergency planning 
and response must naturally focus largely on managing acute staffing shortages.  Federal 
and state guidelines to LHDs for pandemic response, however, offer little practical 
guidance about how best to manage staff shortages, despite wide expectation of such 
shortages. 
Officials reported that the effectiveness of a service or activity was the most 
influential factor in their resource allocation decisions.  Clearly the concept of evidence-
based public health practice, which has been broadly supported in the literature and 
specifically in research agendas in Public Health Systems and Services Research (Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, 2009), has been widely accepted by LHOs.  What is not 
clear, however, is whether officials actually have access to relevant data from studies that 
evaluate the services and activities that they provide, or have the capacity to collect and 
analyze their own data on effectiveness.  According to Brownson and colleagues (2003), 
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there is a paucity of scientific evidence for most of what is done in public health, just as 
there is limited evidence for effectiveness in much of what is done in the broader health 
care system.  The empirical evidence for effectiveness that does exist appears to be 
highly valued by LHOs.  In addition to little evidence of effectiveness, officials do not 
report that decision tools or economic analyses are particularly influential in their 
decision processes.  This may be due to a lack of expertise in applying these techniques 
or to a dearth of useful tools.  It may also be that LHOs are skeptical of the benefits of 
formalizing decision processes; they may feel that their professional experiences and 
knowledge of their communities are adequate guides in allocation processes. 
It was not surprising that officials depended heavily on the previous year‟s budget 
to help determine the next year‟s allocation scheme.  Demand for many public health 
services may not change greatly from one year to another in a particular community (e.g., 
the number of restaurants or campgrounds that require inspection may remain fairly 
stable), and it may not seem efficient to consider anything more than the incremental 
changes to the previous year‟s budget that are required each year.  Moving to a zero-
based budget – one that requires annual justification of the entire budget rather than 
acceptance of the prior year‟s budget with some annual modifications – is no doubt 
substantially more time consuming and complicated for LHOs.  Nonetheless, heavy 
reliance on previous budgets can mean a perpetuation of weaknesses (and strengths) in 
previous decisions, and a focus on line-items as opposed to the broader public health 
goals the LHD is trying to achieve (Finkler and Ward, 1999). 
Most officials (86%) reported that public expectations were moderately or very 
influential in allocation decisions.  In contrast, direct public input (e.g., public meetings) 
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had nearly the lowest impact of all the fifteen factors.   One explanation for these 
seemingly incongruous findings is that LHOs have (or create) few opportunities for any 
type of direct public input, and instead gain an understanding of public expectations from 
an elected BOH or County Commission.  Citizen input in government processes can take 
many forms, including public hearings, community surveys and more participatory 
methods such as focus groups, citizens‟ juries or forums, but these processes are not 
widely used in public health in the U.S. to gauge public perspectives on setting priorities.  
An important construct of stewardship is that citizens must see governing officials‟ 
actions as legitimate.  Creating more situations for direct public input could offer 
legitimacy to LHOs‟ processes for setting priorities among populations and services in 
local public health settings (Abelson et al., 2003; Simonsen and Robbins, 2000; 
Lenaghan, 1999; Smith and Wales, 1999; Gutmann and Thompson, 1997).   
  Finally, we see interesting variation in individual demographic characteristics of 
LHOs.  Do gender roles or professional hierarchies have any role in shaping the ways that 
resources are allocated in public health? Are female nurses, running small LHDs as 
influential in garnering resources from county, state or federal governments as their male, 
physician counterparts at large LHDs?  Do men and women have the same priorities for 
public health services in a community?  Nearly one-quarter of officials running medium 
sized departments were sanitarians or environmental health specialists, a much higher 
proportion than for either small or large departments.  Does the professional background 
of the LHO affect which activities or services are funded?  These are largely sociological 




Limitations.  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to collect and analyze 
data about the types of resource allocation decisions LHOs make, the processes they use 
in allocating resources, and the factors that influence those decisions.  For this reason we 
were not able to use previously validated questions in our survey tool.  In addition, we 
analyzed our data using the size of the population and governance structure as 
comparison groups, but there may be other important comparison groups (e.g., by state) 
that we did not identify in this analysis that could reveal additional, important findings.  
Finally, using only cross-sectional data we were not able to capture potentially important 
changes in allocation decision making that may occur over time. 
 
Conclusions and implications for further research.   
This descriptive study is a first look at primary data focused on allocation 
decisions in public health practice.  It is clear that local health officials take seriously 
their responsibility to fund activities and services that are known to be effective.  Public 
health systems research should continue to expand its focus by emphasizing effectiveness 
research and the translation of that research into practice.  It may be useful to explore the 
factors that limit officials‟ flexibility in allocating resources, and whether greater 
flexibility would bring public health benefits to their communities.   
Future research should develop a clearer understanding of the relative benefits 
and limitations of heterogeneous funding and service structures, and assess the impact on 
both efficiency and equity in allocation of resources.   It may be valuable for LHOs to 
assess the potential usefulness of more structured methods for allocation decisions, such 
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as evaluation frameworks (e.g., Jacobson and Neumann, 2009), economic analyses or 
other decision aids.   
Expansion of opportunities for public engagement in public health priority setting 
or other processes may strengthen ties between LHDs and their communities, and may 
offer new avenues for communication and cooperation.  In the face of staffing shortages, 
tight budgets and unmet need, the community may be able to provide significant 
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Table 2.1:  Demographic Characteristics of Local Health Officials 
 
Characteristic Total n=608 Small n=258 Medium n=292 Large n=58 





 9.9  7.8  
Age (mean) 52.7  52.4*
L
  53.0  54.8
 
 





Race (%)     
  White 96.2 98.0**
 ML
 93.4 87.7 




 4.5 10.5 
  American 
Indian/Alaska 
Native 
0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 




0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Other 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.0 
Ethnicity (%)     





Education (%)  
(highest) 
    





  Masters degree 40.0 31.8 61.0**
 SL
 31.0 





Licensure (%)     





  RN 40.1 50.2**
 ML
 21.3 16.0 




* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significance at the 1 percent level. 
S, M, L 
Significantly different from the estimate for small, medium, or large 








Table 2.2:  Local Health Department Characteristics 
 
Characteristic Total n=608 Small n=258 Medium n=292 Large n=58 
(Population size)  (<50,000) (50,000-499,000) (500,000) 
Population     
  Mean  109,829.3 21,684.2 148,066.8 1,208,135 
  Median 59,170.5 19,189.5 111,473 824,704.5 
Governance (%)     
  State 14.0 14.0 17.5 21.7 
  Local 86.0 86.1 82.5 79.3 





  BOH  appointed 50.1 49.0 55.6 41.8 
  BOH elected 12.9 17.8**
ML
 3.2 1.8 
Budget Approval (%)     





   County  51.1 49.6 53.1 60.3 
   City/town  18.0 18.4 17.1 17.2 
   State 16.0 14.1 19.5 20.7 
   Other 3.6 3.5 4.1 1.7 
Tax Authority (%)     
    BOH   14.7 17.1*
 ML
 9.0 3.6 
     County  61.4 59.3*
L
 65.5 67.3 
     City/town  21.6 19.0*
M
 27.0 25.5 
     State 16.1 15.8 16.2 20.0 
     Other 11.2 9.5 14.4 16.4 
Set  Impose Fees (%)     





     County  43.6 38.7**
 ML
 52.1 60.3 
     City/town  18.8 15.6*
 ML
 24.1 31.0 
     State 28.2 27.0 30.7 31.0 
     Other 4.7 4.3 5.9 3.5 
Request Levy (%)     





    County  57.5 55.6 60.2 68.5 
    City/town  19.4 18.5 20.8 24.1 
    State 13.0 12.8 12.5 20.3 
    Other 9.6 8.6 11.0 14.8 
Adopt  Regs (%)     





    County  43.5 39.5*
 ML
 51.0 53.5 
    City/town  20.7 16.4**
 ML
 28.4 32.8 
    State 34.6 32.0 38.7 44.8 
    Other 2.0 1.6 2.7 3.5 
 
Figures in table represent means or proportions. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
S, M, L  Significantly different from the estimate for small, medium, or large LHDs respectively.  
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Expenditures       
  Median $2,129,382 $858,603 $4,476,582 $40,600,000 $1,876,675 $3,400,000 
    per capita $36.10 $35.69 $36.17 $40.18 $35.57 $41.14 
  Mean $14,100,000 $1,887,064 $6,150,168 $110,000,000 $15,100,000 $8,378,645 
    per capita $88.02 $135.69 $44.24 $105.47 $94.65 $51.59 
       
Total Revenues       
  Median $2,210,842 $778,000 $4,230,828 $44,200,000 $1,969,572 $2,872,479 
  Mean $13,100,000 $2,085,667 $6,046,055 $97,200,000 $14,000,000 $8,276,407 
Revenues by 
source (%) 
      
   City/town   6.7   6.0    8.3   7.4    7.7    0.4** 
   County 18.5 18.3  18.8  19.1  20.2   8.2**  
  State 20.0 19.4  21.1  23.9 17.8 32.1** 
  Federal pass-
through  
16.7 15.8 18.2 18.7 17.3 12.6**  
  Federal direct  2.0 1.3** 
L
  1.8 5.7 1.6 2.1 
  Medicaid 10.4 11.8* 
ML
  8.1 7.2 8.1 25.1**  
  Medicare 5.0 6.1*
 ML
          3.4 1.4 5.3 3.1 




  1.0 0.5 1.6 0.5** 
  Private 
insurance 
0.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.5* 
  Patient fees 4.0 4.4 3.5 3.2 4.4 2.2**  
  Regulatory 
fees 
7.0 6.8  
 
7.8 5.6 8.0 2.2**  
  Tribal sources 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
 
0.0 0.0  
 
  Other 6.5 6.8 6.1 5.8 6.6 5.9 
 
Figures for revenues by source represent proportions. 
 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
S, M, L 


















1.0 4.1 30.9 64.1 
Previous allocation 
 
0.5 3.2 34.7 61.5 
Sole provider 
 
2.0 6.6 30.8 60.5 
Reluctance lay off 
 
4.9 8.0 31.3 55.8 
Input from BOH 
 
6.0 12.2 29.3 52.6 
Input from staff 
 
0.3 4.6 47.3 47.7 
Government guidelines 
 
5.9 16.0 34.2 43.9 
Needs assessments 
 
4.1 16.9 46.4 32.6 
Input County Council 
 
15.3 21.6 31.5 31.6 
Public expectations 
 
1.6 12.0 56.1 30.1 
Economic analyses 
 
9.2 21.4 43.2 26.2 
Input from State 
 
8.5 26.6 39.6 25.4 
Direct public input 
 
11.4 28.8 43.4 16.4 
Decision tools 
 
16.1 27.7 41.1 15.2 
Consult colleagues 
 
5.7 32.4 49.8 12.1 
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S. Wt  = 1/prob of selection 
  Large 121/121 1.00 
  Medium 577/828 1.44 
  Small 629/1855 2.95 
   
Response Rate 
Weight  n=677 
Response Rate* RR Wt = 1/response rate 
  Large 63/115 1.83 
  Medium 309/563 1.82 
  Small 305/611 2.00 








P. Wt = (ratio in 
pop.)/(ratio in weighted 
sample) 












   
Final Weight  (S. Wt)*(RR Wt)*(P. Wt) 
  Large  1*1.83*1 = 1.83 
  Medium  1.44*1.82*0.95 = 2.49 
  Small  2.95*2.00*1.07 = 6.31 




     Normalized Final Weights 
  Large  1.83/4.05= 0.45 
  Medium  2.49/4.05= 0.61 
  Small  6.31/4.05= 1.56 
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The purpose of this survey is to gain a broader understanding of the 
types of resource allocation decisions that local health officials confront 
in their work, the processes used to make allocation decisions and the 
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What is your current position?  ______________________ 
 
Have you been in your current position at least one year? (select only one)  Yes  No,  
*If you checked no, please stop here and return the survey in the envelope provided* 
 
How many years have you been in this position? (please round to the nearest whole number; no 
fractions or decimals) ______________________ 
 
The first six questions ask about the types of resource allocation decisions you make 
in your work. 
 
 
1. In the most recently completed fiscal year, to what extent did you do each 
of  





























a. Shifted resources from one population group to another.     
b. Added activities offered by (or contracted for) your department.     
c. Eliminated activities offered (or contracted for) by your department.     
d. Increased funding to one or more activities.     
e. Decreased funding to one or more activities.      
f. Changed the way you allocated your time to emphasize particular tasks.     
g. Directed your staff to change the tasks they perform, including retraining in 
new  
    skills. 
    
h. Directed contractors to change the tasks they perform.     
 
 




























































































3. How much has the allocation of FTEs in your department changed in the past fiscal 
year?  
    (e.g., Greatly increased number of sanitarians) 
   
 
 
4. In the most recently completed fiscal year, did you have to manage an acute shortage of any of  




a. Vaccines   
b. Medications   
c. Work force   
d. Other (specify)   
 
 
5. In the most recently completed fiscal year, did you do any of the following in the process of  
    planning for a public health emergency:[check yes or no for each] 
Yes No 
a. Determine how to allocate emergency or disaster planning funds?   
b. Decide how to manage an expected shortage of biological resources (e.g., vaccines) in a 
potential public health emergency or disaster? 
  
c. Decide how to manage non-biological materials or equipment (e.g. beds; antiviral medications;  
    oxygen; space) expected to be in short supply during a public health emergency or disaster? 
  
d. Determine how to manage staffing shortages expected during a public health emergency or  




6. In your most recently completed fiscal year, did you do any of the following in response to an  
    actual public health emergency:[check yes or no for each] 
Yes No 
a. Determine how to allocate funds?   
b. Decide how to manage an expected shortage of biological resources?   
c. Decide how to manage non-biological materials or equipment (e.g. beds; antiviral medications;  
    oxygen; space)? 
  
d. Determine how to manage staffing shortages?   
 
The next two questions ask about the processes you use to make allocations 
decisions in your work. 
 
 




















a. Consult staff/personnel?      
b. Consult colleagues in other local health departments?     
c. Consult colleagues at the state health department?     
d. Consult Board of Health or County Council?     
e. Review governmental guidelines for allocation?     
f. Use economic analyses (e.g., cost-effectiveness analyses, Program Budgeting and  
   Marginal Analysis)? 
    
g. Conduct needs assessment(s)?     





     
 
8. When making resource allocation decisions, how influential are each of 


















































a. Previous allocations [Prior year's budget]      
b. Input from staff/personnel      
c. Reluctance to lay off employees      
d. Colleagues from other health departments      
e. Input from state health departments      
f. Governmental guidelines for allocation      
g. Input from Board of Health       
h. Input from County Council      
h. Public expectations      
i. Direct public input (e.g., public meetings)      
j. Effectiveness of activity      
k. Results of economic analyses       
l. Results from the use of decision tools      
m. Results from community needs assessment      
n. Sole provider of an activity in the community      
 
 










































































9. Overall, how much control do you have over the resource 
allocation decisions in your department?       
 
      
 
 
10. What proportion of your department's total funds (from all sources) can you reallocate, 
at your discretion, to better meet the health needs of your community? [0% -100%] 
 




11. What proportion of your department's total personnel time and effort can you reallocate, 











The following questions ask how, if you had complete discretion, you might modify 





12a) Are community needs for adult immunization being met?  (select only one)   Yes   No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on adult 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)  
      Increase                Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you decrease 
to increase funding to adult immunization? 
On which activity or service 
would you spend the savings? 
 
Go To Next 




12b) Are community needs for lead screening being met? (select only one)   Yes   No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on lead 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one) 
      Increase     Decrease    Maintain 
What activity or service would you decrease 
in order to increase funding to lead 
screening? 
On which activity or service 
would you spend the 
savings? 
 









12c)  Are community needs for emergency preparedness being met?  (select only one)    Yes   No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on 





If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)    
      Increase     Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you 
decrease in order to increase funding to 
emergency preparedness? 
On which activity or 










12d) Are community needs for food service establishment inspection being met? (select only one)   
Yes  No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on food 
service establishment inspection? (Enter 0% if you do not currently offer this 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level?  (select only one)  
  
      Increase                       Decrease       Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you decrease 
in order to increase funding to food service 
establishment inspection? 
On which activity or 










12e) Are community needs for communicable disease surveillance inspection being met?  
(select only one)   Yes  No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on 
communicable disease surveillance? (Enter 0% if you do not currently offer this 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)  
      Increase        Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you decrease 
in order to increase funding to 
communicable disease surveillance 
inspection? 
On which activity or 













12f) Are community needs for high blood pressure screening being met?  (select only one)   Yes   
No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on high blood 





If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)   
     Increase        Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you 
decrease in order to increase funding to 
high blood pressure screening? 
On which activity or 












12g) Are community needs for oral health care being met?  (select only one)    Yes   No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on oral health 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)    
      Increase                                   Decrease                  Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you 
decrease in order to increase funding to 
oral health care? 
On which activity or 
service would you spend 
the savings? 
 







12h) Are community needs for behavioral risk factor surveillance being met?  (select only one)   Yes 
 No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on 
behavioral risk factor surveillance? (Enter 0% if you do not currently offer 







If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)     
      Increase     Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you decrease 
in order to increase funding to behavioral 
risk factor surveillance? 
On which activity or service 











12i) Are community needs for ground water inspection being met?   (select only one)    Yes  No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on ground 
water inspection? (Enter 0% if you do not currently offer this activity or 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level?  (select only one)   
      Increase        Decrease      Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you 
decrease in order to increase funding to 
ground water inspection? 
On which activity or service 











12j) Are community needs for mental illness prevention being met? (select only one)   Yes   No 
 
Approximately what portion of your current budget do you spend on mental 
illness prevention? (Enter 0% if you do not currently offer this activity or 




If you were able, would you increase, decrease, or maintain this level? (select only one)   
      Increase     Decrease    Maintain 
 
What activity or service would you decrease 
in order to increase funding to mental illness 
prevention? 
On which activity or service 
would you spend the savings? 
 






13. Please list two activities or services not listed in Question 12 for which you would be most 
willing to  
      decrease current allocations in order to increase allocations elsewhere.  (Question 12 asked 
about adult  
      immunization, lead screening, emergency preparedness, food service establishment inspection,  




























































a. Understands the needs of local health departments like yours.     
b. Makes decisions based primarily on scientific evidence.     
c. Directs the appropriate level of resources toward the most important public health   
    problems facing the nation. 
    
d. Makes decisions independent of political pressure.     
e. Has adequate communication plans in place for communicating with local public  
    health departments in an emergency. 
    
f. Is adequately staffed to respond to a widespread emergency (i.e. an influenza  
   pandemic). 
    





15. In your opinion, is the level of emphasis that the CDC gives to each of the following  




















a. Vaccine safety    
b. Disaster preparedness    
c. Gun violence    
d. Global health    
e. HIV/AIDs    
f. TB control    
g. Disease surveillance    
h. Environmental health issues    
i. Social determinants of health    









Thank you for completing this survey.   
Please return the survey in the postage paid envelope to: 
 
 
Susan D. Goold, MD, MHSA, MA, Principal Investigator 
University of Michigan 
Bioethics Program 
300 N. Ingalls, 7C27 








The Role of Discretion in the Resource Allocation Decisions 
of Local Public Health Officials 
 
In recent years, public health researchers have emphasized the considerable 
variation in the way that U.S. public health system is structured.  Local public health 
departments (LHDs) differ in governance structure, jurisdiction, funding structure, 
services provided and activities offered (Mays and Smith, 2009; NACCHO, 2009; Leviss, 
2008).  Unfortunately, one thing LHDs share is the burden of meeting the public health 
needs of their communities with insufficient resources and infrastructure.  Funding for 
public health services is fragmented, and it is difficult for LHDs to ensure core programs 
(Scutchfield and Keck, 2009; Turnock, 2004; IOM, 2003a).  Local public health officials 
(LHOs) work both to garner adequate resources for public health services, and maximize 
the use of the resources that are currently in the system.   
LHOs are charged with making resource allocation decisions that accord with the 
needs and priorities of the populations they serve.  This task is complicated by the facts 
that revenues come from many sources and that significant portions of revenues are 
earmarked for particular programs or services.  Some officials complain that they lack the 
flexibility to allocate funds in order to best serve their communities (Baum et al., 2009).  
Federal categorical funding is widely criticized as too restrictive in the ways it can be 
spent.  Officials and academics alike suggest that such funding restrictions cause LHDs to 
tailor their activities and services to federal priorities rather than to local public health 




issues in public health practice in Michigan, some public health officials argued that they 
did not have adequate discretion in their allocation decision making, and that this lack of 
discretion hindered their abilities to meet the public health needs in their communities 
(Baum et al., 2009).   
We conducted a national survey of LHOs to examine the nature and scope of their 
resource allocation decisions.  In particular, two goals of this study were to assess the 
degree of discretion officials report in allocating resources and the factors that influence 
that discretion, and to explore whether discretion is associated with officials‟ abilities to 
ensure that their communities‟ public health needs are met. 
 
Background  
Financing of local public health services.  Revenues for local public health 
services originate from all levels of government as well as from many private sources.  
The federal government allocates funds to LHDs mainly in the form of block grants, 
formula grants and categorical programs.  Block grants such as the Preventive Health and 
Health Services block grant or the Maternal and Child Health block grant are generally 
allocated to states, and states further allocate them to LHDs through a variety of contracts 
and formulas.  Block grants offer states and LHDs the most flexibility to tailor funding to 
local needs.  They are, however, more susceptible to budget reductions because they are 
not well defined and do not develop supportive constituencies the way more specific 
programs often do (Leviss, 2008).  Formula grants and categorical funding are distributed 
based on criteria such as disease prevalence and demonstrated population need.  This type 




defined programs or services, and often contains unfunded mandates that require 
additional funding from state, local or other sources (Plough, 2004).  The federal 
government also provides a small amount of direct support (e.g., CDC Healthy 
Communities grant).  Payments from Medicare and Medicaid constitute additional 
federal (and state) funding for LHDs as well. 
 State direct revenues are one of the largest sources of funds for most LHDs and 
also vary a great deal from state to state.  Most states provide services (e.g., laboratory 
services) as well as funding to LHDs through contracts and per capita or other formulas 
that determine need.  Local revenues are considered to be the most flexible of public 
funding sources and are generally raised by city or county governments (e.g., a dedicated 
public health levy).  Other local revenues include fees for certain services, vital statistics 
and fines (Scutchfield and Keck, 2009; Leviss, 2008; Mays, 2008).   
Sources of revenue vary depending on not just the need for services but also 
whether the LHD is governed at the state or the local level.  Those governed at the state 
level receive higher proportions of revenues from states and from Medicaid than those 
governed locally.  Those governed locally receive more funding from local sources and 
from federal revenues passed through states.  They also receive more from private 
foundations, private insurance, and patient and regulatory fees.  When we compare 
revenues by the size of the population served by the LHD, there are many fewer 
significant differences.  Those serving populations under 50,000 receive higher 
proportions of revenues from Medicare and Medicaid and lower proportions from federal 




While the sources of government funding for public health are many, they add up 
to a very small proportion of overall national health expenditures.  Federal, state and local 
government expenditures for public health activity accounted for less than three percent 
of our national health expenditures in 2007 (U.S. DHHS, 2009).  There have been many 
efforts over the years to boost government spending on public health activities, but 
spending on public health activities and services remains low.  Only spending earmarked 
for emergency preparedness has grown substantially in recent years.  For now, health 
departments must consider how to make the most of the current level of public health 
spending.  Examining the level of discretion given to LHOs to make allocation decisions 
may help to determine whether current resources are being used as effectively as 
possible.  That is, with adequate discretion, LHOs may be able to reallocate current funds 
in ways that achieve greater community health. 
Bureaucratic discretion. Political agency theory traditionally depicts a power 
relationship between a principal (e.g., a legislator) who has authority and an agenda, and 
an agent (e.g., an agency bureaucrat) who has specific knowledge and skills.  According 
to this theory, a principal must delegate some authority to an agent to allow the agent to 
efficiently execute the agenda, but not so much as to risk losing control (Lupia, 2004; 
Huber and Shipan, 2002; Lipsky, 1980).  The notion of bureaucratic discretion is the 
latitude given to bureaucrats to make decisions, deploy public resources and implement 
policies based on their expertise, within the confines of particular legislation or rules 
(Scott, 1997; Bryner, 1987; Lipsky, 1980).   The degree of discretion a bureaucrat can 




amount of discretion they have by knowing their constraints (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987). 
At its best, bureaucratic discretion encourages creativity and allows managers to 
custom fit programs to community needs.  It creates opportunities to make the most of 
resources.  Discretion can also encourage outside participation in problem solving, which 
can in turn engender trust in an organization or a government (Hall, 1997; Moore, 1995).  
Laws and rules limit discretion to ensure that certain political or organizational goals are 
achieved and to ensure that there is some uniformity and neutrality in decision processes.  
But rules are rigid, and lawmakers cannot always anticipate the complexity of the 
situation or problem that the rules are designed to solve.  At times, rules conflict with 
other rules, or are contrary to what justice demands.  Discretion allows managers to 
resolve such conflict, and meet the demands of justice (Haque, 2004; Hall, 1997; 
Schneider, 1992).   
Discretion does, however, have significant limitations.  It may allow bureaucrats 
to introduce individual biases into the execution of their duties.  As unelected actors in 
the policy process, they may breach norms of democratic governance if they stray from 
politically established goals and forge independent approaches to problem solving.  
Discretion may allow favoritism, or it may introduce imprecision and uncertainty into 
decision processes (Keiser, 1999; Hall, 1997).  According to Vaughn and Otenyo (2007), 
public trust in government has declined in recent years, in part because of public 
cynicism about managers applying their discretion unevenly when allocating resources 
among different sectors of society.  The public may see innovation by public managers as 




such innovation from managers in private industry (Moore, 1995).  Some have a 
particular concern about the role of bureaucratic discretion in allocating resources that are 
particularly scarce.  They worry that bureaucrats may use their discretion “to survive” by, 
for example, choosing to avoid serving difficult individuals or population groups, thereby 
denying some the services to which they are entitled (Keiser, 1999, p. 89). 
Determinants of discretion.  Public administration theory suggests there are at 
least three important determinants of bureaucratic discretion: characteristics of the 
organizations in which bureaucrats function; the populations those organizations serve; 
and individual characteristics of the bureaucrats who run them (Scott, 1997; Kelly, 1994).  
Using an experimental design, Scott (1997) determined that organizational factors were 
the most influential in determining levels of bureaucratic discretion, followed by 
attributes of the population served, with the individual characteristics of the decision 
makers being the least influential.  Other scholars specify that discretion can be 
determined in part by a manager‟s individual ability to see or create opportunities in 
which to exercise his discretion (e.g., in a political environment) and to envision the 
action his discretion will allow him to take (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).   
Bureaucratic discretion can be created in a variety of ways.  Simply the absence 
of clear directives in legislative language can create some flexibility for public 
administrators.  Leys (1997) contrasts this view of discretion as indefinite legal 
terminology with a more purposeful freedom to ensure that policies fit what local 
communities need or want.  Legislation creates boundaries within which bureaucrats can 
function.  For example, federal funding structures for state public health services directly 




Preventive Health and Health Services block grant) which no two states use in the same 
way creates flexible funding structures for clinic and other public health services. 
Relative to categorical funding streams, block grants offer LHOs more flexibility to 
operate in ways that are not necessarily directly tied to federal priorities (Mays, 2008).   
Federal funding is a major source of revenue for all LHDs, especially large metropolitan 
public health departments.  Research by Plough found that the “categorical and restricted 
nature” of federal funding structures create serious financial management issues for 
LHDs, which affects “the sustainability and continuity of services” (2004, p. 425).   An 
increase in resource availability, whether through increased revenues or greater sharing of 
responsibilities with other agencies or community partners, can increase discretion by 
providing the necessary room in the budget or freeing up staff time (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987). 
Effects of discretion. The public administration literature begins to link the 
concept of bureaucratic discretion with the potential to achieve desired outcomes.  
Research by Sowa and Seldon (2003) shows that administrators who perceive higher 
levels of discretion are more likely to enact outcomes that favor their particular goals.    
In an analysis of justice and discretion, Kelly (1994) found that when administrative 
discretion is high, individual bureaucrats‟ conceptions of justice affect the policies that 
ultimately are implemented.  In our own recent study of ethical issues in public health 
practice, practitioners in one state reported that they did not have adequate discretion in 
allocation decisions and that this lack of discretion had a negative impact on their abilities 




Some researchers have explored the relationship between the mix of funding sources for 
local public health and the performance of LHDs, but there is virtually no research that 
explores the effect that differing levels of discretion in allocation of that funding may 
have on health department performance.   
Measures of discretion.  Despite theoretical and empirical efforts to define it, 
bureaucratic discretion remains a fairly abstract construct.  No one method for measuring 
discretion has been broadly accepted.  In the political science literature, discretion has 
been measured based on the length and complexity of bills or laws, with the implication 
that longer, more detailed and complex bills allow less discretion to the bureaucrats who 
must execute them than shorter, more ambiguous bills (Huber and Shipan, 2002).  For 
certain categorical government programs (e.g., Social Security disability insurance), 
bureaucratic discretion has been measured via proxy; the greater the proportion of 
individuals  a  program covers, the greater the amount of discretion in coverage decisions 
is assumed to reside with the bureaucrat in charge (Keiser, 1999).  
 Expert rating systems have also been used to quantify bureaucratic discretion 
through qualitative assessments.  Panels of academic or industry experts have assessed 
industries and rated the discretion given to managers in those industries.  The experts 
rated various industries as high, medium or low discretion industries based on a variety of 
criteria.  In one such scheme described by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995), a LHD 
would be categorized as an industry with low discretion because resources are derived 
directly from government.  Other experts have used Likert-type scales to assign numeric 
ratings to quantify managerial discretion in different industries. Some have employed 




researchers counted the number of relevant words used in communication with 
shareholders to determine the level of discretion in industry groups.  In one example, 
researchers counted words that contained the root “regulat,” with higher counts 
suggesting lower discretion (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995).   
Sowa and Selden (2003) contend that individual-level measures of perceived 
discretion are appropriate for assessing the impact of discretion on policy outcomes.  
They posit that bureaucrats in similar organizational structures bring different values and 
experiences to their work environments, which allow them to perceive different levels of 
discretion in their work.  In their work they found that both tenure in position and level of 
education were positively correlated with discretion. 
Finally, many scholars view discretion as a complex construct which may be 
difficult to measure.  Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) suggest that because of such 
complexity, using multiple measures of discretion in analysis is ideal.  They and others 
emphasize the need for further research to identify and measure factors that determine 
and influence discretion.   
 
Research questions and conceptual framework 
This study examined discretion in allocation decision making by local public 
health officials in the U.S.  We were guided by three specific questions: 1) What level of 
discretion in allocation decision making do LHOs report?  2) Is there an association 
between revenue sources and levels of discretion? and, 3) Is there an association between 





 Based on the literature on bureaucratic discretion, we would expect that LHOs‟ 
discretion would be associated with organization-, population- and individual-level 
factors.  Relevant organization-level factors might include: the laws that govern local 
public health practice at all levels of government; level of oversight by governing bodies, 
such as boards of health or county commissioners, and any additional constraints they 
may create; the level of resources available to the LHO, including financial and human 
resources as well as capacity and supplies (e.g., availability of a dental clinic; availability 
of vaccines).  Population-level factors may include: the level of demand for public health 
services, determined by the health status of the population; the size of the population; 
whether the community has access to other providers besides the LHD; and public 
expectations.  Individual-level factors may include: the level of expertise and experience 
of LHOs in public health practice or related fields; the nature of the working relationship 
between the LHO and governing bodies (e.g., level of communication and trust the LHO 
has with their board of health (BOH); and the LHO‟s capacity for seeing opportunities to 
exercise discretion (e.g., level of political acumen or personal creativity).  A model 
predicting discretion would ideally include data from each of these domains, but we are 
not aware of a dataset that contains relevant data from all of them. 
 
Data and Methods   
This study employed data from two recent sources.  The first is a national survey 
of LHOs in the U.S. that we designed and conducted in 2008-2009.  The survey asked 
LHOs about the types of resource allocation decisions they make and what factors 




in three ways, and asked whether public health needs are met for ten activities and 
services.  The sampling frame was a list, maintained by the National Association of 
County & City Health Officials (NACCHO), of all LHDs including names and contact 
information for 2820 LHOs.  We stratified our sample by the size of the population 
served by the LHD, because departments of different sizes are known to have different 
funding and governance structures and to offer different activities and services to their 
populations.  Stratification by population size enabled us to include the experiences of 
LHOs from all types of LHDs in our data.  We selected n=1327 officials from 121 large, 
577 medium and 629 small departments for our survey.  The overall response rate for the 
survey was 53% (n= 685).  Survey design and recruiting are described in detail in the 
previous chapter.    
The second data source is the 2008 National Profile of Local Health Departments, 
a national survey of all LHDs in the U.S., conducted by NACCHO in 2008.  The Profile 
is a periodic effort to collect uniform data about the functioning of LHDs.  The 2008 
Profile is preceded by four other studies like it since 1989, each intending to collect data 
on the structure, function and capacity of LHDs.  The 2008 Profile includes the only 
recent source of financial (revenue and expenditure) data, as well as data on jurisdiction 
and governance structures, activities and services offered by LHDs, workforce, and 
emergency preparedness activities.  Overall, 83% of all LHDs (n=2332) responded to the 
2008 Profile.  We merged the Profile data with our data using a unique LHD identifier for 
total merged sample size n=608.  Most data items were missing at rates less than 10%.  
However, Profile data on revenue sources were missing at rates of 15-26%, with data 




No other patterns were identified in the missing data.  Analyses were conducted without 
imputation. 
 Research questions. We did not identify any research that measured discretion in 
public health allocation decision making or any published, validated survey questions that 
would measure discretion in this context.  Therefore, we designed the following three 
survey questions as part of a larger survey about resource allocation, as described in 
Chapter 2, to measure LHOs‟ discretion:  
1) Overall, how much control do you have over the resource allocation decisions in your 
department? [I have no control; A small amount of control; Moderate control; A great 
deal of control; Complete control; Unable to rate]   
2) What proportion of your department‟s total funds (from all sources) can you reallocate, 
at your discretion, to better meet the health needs of your community? [0%-100%] and  
3) What proportion of your department‟s total personnel time and effort can you 
reallocate, at your discretion, to better meet the health needs of your community? [0%-
100%]   
We specified two hypotheses for this study. We expected that 1) higher 
proportions of local funding would be associated with higher levels of discretion, and 2) 
higher levels of discretion would be associated with lower levels of unmet need for ten 
public health activities and services. 
We employed four dependent variables in our analyses.  Three variables measured 
LHOs‟ discretion in resource allocation decision making, based on questions 1-3 above 




constructed for the proportion of public health needs that are met in a community for ten 
specific activities and services (%Needs Met).   
We conducted Pearson‟s correlations and Spearman‟s rank tests to determine 
correlations among the three discretion variables (Kutner, Nachtsheim and Neter, 2004).  
The purpose of assessing the level of correlation among these three discretion variables 
was to determine whether to combine them to form one composite measure of discretion 
(which we would consider if they were highly correlated), and to help establish construct 
validity; that is, to help determine to what extent we were actually measuring the 
construct we set out to measure (Trochim, 2001).  
The public administration literature on discretion suggests that policy outcomes 
may depend, in part, on bureaucratic discretion.  Therefore, we constructed a fourth 
dependent variable to assess whether there was an association between levels of 
discretion and LHOs‟ abilities to ensure that public health needs are met in their 
communities (% Needs Met).  It was constructed from questions that asked LHOs 
whether the needs were met in their communities for ten public health activities or 
services.  The variable represents the proportion of “yes” responses to the ten questions.  
These ten were selected to represent various aspects of local public health, including 
some clinic services, some regulatory activities and some surveillance activities.  They 
were also chosen to represent some services that nearly all LHDs provide, some that few 
provide (but may have partners in the community who provide them) and some for which 
unmet need is generally assumed to be high (e.g., oral health care).  The activities and 
services included: adult immunization; lead screening; emergency preparedness; food 




screening; oral health care; behavioral risk factor surveillance; ground water inspection; 
and mental illness prevention.   
 Explanatory regression variables were chosen a priori, based on limited evidence 
in the public health practice literature on LHD performance, and for consistency with the 
construct of bureaucratic discretion.  One explanatory variable of interest was constructed 
to represent the proportion of LHD revenues arising from local (city and county) sources, 
to determine whether there was an association between the proportion of revenues from 
local funds and discretion.  As discussed above, our own interviews with public health 
practitioners have indicated that local revenues may offer more flexibility in allocation, 
especially in comparison to federal revenues.  We also included an indicator variable for 
the presence of a board of health.  While the literature is mixed on the role of boards of 
health in improving the performance of public health departments, some studies have 
indicated that “policy-making” boards of health positively affect LHD performance 
(Bhandari, et al., 2008; Mays, et al., 2006; Scutchfield et al., 2004).  We included a 
continuous variable for the size of the population served because there is some evidence 
that larger health departments also positively affect performance (Savoia, et al., 2009; 
Bhandari, et al., 2008;Mays et al., 2006; ).  We also included an indicator variable for the 
governance structure of the LHD (e.g., whether the department is governed locally or at 
the state level) because the locus of control may have an important impact on determining 
LHOs‟ discretion.  The governance variable was constructed by NACCHO, based on a 
Profile question asking which body had the authority to hire/fire the LHO.
6
  For similar 
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 The question asked LHOs to choose all categories that applied among: local board of health, county 
government, city/town government, state health agency or other.  When it was unclear whether the 





reasons we included an indicator variable for whether the BOH had the authority to 
approve the LHD‟s budget.  
  In addition, we constructed a variable for per capita expenditures. A recent study 
showed that per capita expenditures on public health in the U.S. vary among LHDs by a 
factor of 13, due in part to differences in the services and activities provided (Mays and 
Smith, 2009).  The per capita expenditures variable in our dataset had an extremely wide 
range of values, from less than one dollar to $13,000.  Based on the recent evidence on 
variation, and because the median expenditure in our data was $36.10, we decided to 
exclude values greater than $500 from these analyses.
7
   
As discussed above, the discretion literature suggests that in addition to 
organization-level factors, population- and individual-level factors may also be important 
in determining bureaucratic discretion.  We included race variables (separate, continuous 
variables for the proportion of each racial group in the population) largely because these 
were the only population-level variables available in this merged dataset, besides the size 
of the population.  A large body of literature has established complex relationships 
between race and social factors, and the resultant effects on health status (IOM, 2003b).  
It may be that the racial make-up of the population affects the types of services and 
activities the LHD offers, which would be associated with variation in revenue streams as 
well. The coefficients on population race variables are particularly difficult to interpret 
because the relationship between race and discretion seems far removed.  We included 
race largely because it was the only population-level variable our dataset included besides 
                                                 
7
 A common standard for determining outliers is 1.5 x interquartile range (Moore and McCabe, 2003).  In 
the case of high variation in per capita spending this standard would exclude a large proportion of 




the size of the population, yet it is not clear just how population race may be associated 
with various levels of discretion.     
We included the number of years of experience the LHO had in her position, 
gender, and the education level of the LHO as individual-level factors that may affect 
discretion.  Each of these may play a role in determining whether LHOs are seen as 
capable, trustworthy experts in the eyes of boards of health, county commissioners, and 
members of the public, all of whom may influence LHOs‟ levels of discretion.   [See 
Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses.]    
We also used the three measures of discretion as explanatory variables in bivariate 
regressions to determine whether there is an association between a LHO‟s discretion and 
% Needs Met, the proportion of public health needs that are met in the community for ten 
specific activities and services.  In addition, we estimated levels of discretion by each of 
the public health activities, and compared the means of two groups (those reporting that 
needs are met vs. needs are not met) using Student‟s t-tests (Moore and McCabe, 2003).   
We constructed survey weights for unequal probability of selection into the 
sample, differences in response rates, and stratification so that our sample would be 
consistent with the overall population of LHOs in the U.S. (Lee and Forthofer, 2006).    
Multivariate analyses using ordinary least squares regression for continuous variables
8
 on 
cross-sectional data estimated the models for two of the discretion variables (%Funds and 
%Personnel).  The ordinal discretion variable for Overall control was estimated using 
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 The current analyses treat the three dependent variables measured as proportions (the proportion of funds 
the LHO can reallocate, the proportion of personnel time the LHO can reallocate, and the proportion of 
times the LHO responded “yes” to a series of questions asking whether community health needs are met for 
ten activities and services) as continuous variables, despite the fact that they are bounded at 0 and 100.  
Since all three variables have fairly full distributions, we decided that exploratory analyses should be 
conducted in OLS because OLS estimates are more stable in the face of non-normal residuals or 
heteroscedasticity than tobit estimates.  Future analyses will employ tobit or other generalized linear 




ordered logistic regression.  We used a log transformation on the two continuous 
variables for discretion to improve normality and linearity. Reduced models were also 
tested to determine whether models with fewer variables would improve the model fit.  
All analyses were conducted with STATA 10 software, using the svy: command to 
correct for sampling design. 
The report of the 2008 Profile data emphasized that revenue and expenditure data 
must be interpreted with caution because of higher levels of missing data, but also 
because they were aware that some LHDs had difficulty conveying the level of detail 
requested by the survey.  NACCHO anticipated this difficulty and included a question in 
the Profile asking whether the LHD‟s financial system allowed respondents to distinguish 
between two types of revenues (those that originated at the state level and those that 
originated at the federal level and were passed through states), and to report on them 
accurately.  As a sensitivity analysis we estimated models both on the full dataset 
(n=608) and on a subset of the data that included only those who responded that they 
could make the distinction (or could make reasonably accurate estimates) between state 
and federal pass-through funds (n=476). 
 The University of Michigan Medical School‟s Institutional Review Board 
approved the study. 
 
Results 
Demographic characteristics of local health officials and their departments can be 




The three discretion variables were moderately correlated with one another 
(Pearson correlation for the correlation between % Funds and % Personnel time = .62.  
Spearman rank for % Funds and Overall control = .46, and for the % Personnel time and 
Overall control = .35).   
Discretion by size of population and by governance category. Local health officials 
reported that they can reallocate, on average, 32% of their department‟s total funds at 
their discretion to better meet the health needs of their communities.
9
  They also reported 
that they can reallocate, on average, 48% of their total personnel time and effort at their 
discretion.  Sixty-five percent reported that they had a “great deal” or “complete” control 
in allocation decisions.   
Bivariate OLS regression indicated that there were no significant differences 
among the three measures of discretion by population size category.  There were, 
however, significant differences in levels of discretion between state and local 
governance structures.  Officials in locally governed departments reported that they can 
reallocate ten percentage points more of their funds and 14 percentage points more of 
their personnel time and effort than those governed at the state level.  Bivariate ordered 
logistic regression analysis of the ordinal variable Overall control yielded a proportional 
odds ratio of 4.55, meaning that for those locally governed, the odds of complete control 
versus the combination of all other categories of control are 4.55 times greater.
10
  [See 
Table 3.1 for discretion variables by size and governance category.] 
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 Thirty-six LHOs (six percent of all respondents) reported that they could reallocate 100% of their funds at 
their discretion.  We did not identify any consistent patterns in this group; they were from all three size 
categories, both governance categories and from a variety of states.     
10
 Because of the proportional odds assumption in ordered logistic regression, the same increase of 4.55 
times is found between any one category of overall control and the combination of all other categories 




Multivariable models. Table 3.2 displays summary statistics for the variables used in 
regression models.  Table 3.3 displays the results from the full multivariable OLS 
regression models for both the proportion of total funds LHOs can reallocate, and for the 
proportion of personnel time and effort they can reallocate at their discretion.  It also 
includes estimates from a subset of the data “restricted” only to observations where the 
respondent replied that their financial system allowed them to distinguish between funds 
that originated from the state vs. from a federal source, or that they could make a 
reasonably good estimate of the distinction (476/570 observations remained in the 
restricted set). 
 In general, the models explain little of the variation in the discretion variables, 
and standard errors are large for most model coefficients.  To assess levels of 
multicollinearity in the models, we regressed each predictor variable on all other 
predictor variables in each model to determine how much of each variable‟s effect is 
independent of the other variables.  In all models, only the interaction term showed a low 
amount of independent variation (about 5%).   
Both models (as well as their restricted versions) indicate that the presence of a 
BOH may have a moderating effect on the relationship between per capita expenditures 
and discretion.  In the models estimating % Funds, when there is no BOH, a one dollar 
increase in per capita expenditures would be associated with a reduction of 0.4%
11
 of the 
% Funds that officials could reallocate, holding all other variables constant.  However, in 
the presence of a BOH, the same increase of one dollar in per capita expenditures would 
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 Since the dependent variables % Funds and %Personnel time have been log-transformed and 
the predictors have not, the interpretation of the coefficients is that the dependent variable 
changes by approximately 100*(coefficient) percent for a one unit increase in the independent 





have almost no effect on the proportion of funds that could be reallocated.  The model 
estimating % Personnel time shows similar moderating effects.  Few other predictor 
variables in the models are significant.  The variable for gender of the LHO is significant 
in the model predicting %Personnel time, and indicates that female LHOs are associated 
with a 19% increase (21% in the restricted model) in discretion.  The size of the 
population may have a small, negative effect on %Personnel time as well.  The 
coefficients on the LHO education variables appear to have a generally decreasing 
relationship with discretion but most are not significant; two coefficients are significant 
in the two restricted models.  Many of the signs on the education coefficients switched 
when we estimated the restricted model of proportion of funds.   
The coefficient for the variable %  Local revenues (our predictor variable of 
interest for our hypothesis) was negative in three of the four models, and was not 
significant in any model.  None of the population race variables, the governance variable, 
nor the variable for LHO experience were significant in any of the OLS models.  The 
model F statistic was marginally significant for the model for %Funds (but not for the 
restricted version) and the R
2
 = .055 on 508 observations (412 for the restricted model).  
The model F statistic for the %Personnel time was significant (also for the restricted 
model) and the R
2
 = .09 (.11 for the restricted version) on 520 observations (421 in the 
restricted model). 
Table 3.4 displays the results from the ordered logistic model estimation.  While 
the model F test is significant, few of the odds ratios are statistically significant.  Only the 
governance variable has a strong significant odds ratio.  The model suggests that the odds 




times greater for those locally governed than those governed by the state.  A similar, 
somewhat smaller effect is shown in the restricted ordered logit model.  The coefficient 
on size is marginally significant, but the odds ratio is very nearly one.  There appears to 
be an upward, positive trend in the education variables in this model, but only one 
coefficient is marginally significant.  The coefficient on one race group, Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, is significant, meaning that the odds of complete control 
versus the combination of all other control categories are 2.39 times greater for Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander as compared to the “Other” race group (which has been 
excluded from the model to avoid perfect collinearity).  The odds ratio for this race 
category are higher (5.32) in the restricted ordered logit model.  The odds ratios are 
positive but not significant for the proportion of local funds in both the ologit and the 
restricted ologit models.   
Proportion of needs met for ten activities and services. On average, LHOs responded 
that the needs in their communities were met for six of ten public health activities and 
services we specified in our survey.  Officials from large departments reported 
significantly lower proportions of Needs Met than those from medium and small 
departments.  Sixty-five percent reported that needs were met for adult immunization, yet 
those running large departments were significantly much more likely to report unmet 
need.  The need for lead screening was also met in 65% of communities, with locally 
governed communities reporting a lower level of unmet need than those governed at the 
state level.  The vast majority of officials reported that the needs for food inspection and 
water inspection were met (84% and 80% respectively), and the need for emergency 




pressure screening differed significantly for all three size categories, with unmet need 
increasing as the size of the departments increased. 
Departments governed at the state level also reported greater unmet need for 
blood pressure screening than those governed locally.  Less than one quarter of all 
officials reported that the oral health needs in their community were met, but those from 
smaller departments reported that oral health needs were met more than from larger 
departments.   Forty-six percent of officials reported the need for behavioral risk 
surveillance was met, but only 23% said the need for mental health services in their 
communities was satisfied.  Again, as the size of the department increased, the unmet 
need for mental health services increased.  [See Table 3.5.] 
For nine of the ten activities and services, the mean of %Funds that can be 
reallocated is higher for LHOs in departments who reported that their needs were met, 
compared to those whose needs are not met, and four of the differences in means are 
significant at p≤ .05.  [See Table 3.6.]  All ten means are higher for the needs met group 
when we assess the mean %Personnel time that can be reallocated.  [See Table 3.7.]  
Student‟s t-tests indicate significant differences in means between the two groups (needs 
met vs. needs not met) for six of the activities and services.  In bivariate OLS regressions, 
both the %Funds and %Personnel time had small, positive and significant coefficients 
indicating associations with the aggregate variable %Needs Met.   The Overall control 
variable also had a small, positive significant association with %Needs Met, but only for 
the level of “complete control” as compared to the reference category of “I have no 






In this study we measured bureaucratic discretion in the context of local public 
health practice in three ways: by the proportion of total funds LHOs can reallocate; by the 
proportion of personnel time and effort LHOs can reallocate; and by the overall level of 
control they report in allocation decision making.  While discretion is a complex 
construct, by collecting data using three separate but related survey questions we can 
triangulate findings to begin to build a clearer understanding of LHOs‟ flexibility and 
control in allocation decisions.   
LHOs reported that they could reallocate, at their discretion, about one third of all 
the revenues that support their LHDs.  Is this enough flexibility and control to accomplish 
the essential services of public health practice?  Of the many revenue sources that finance 
public health practice, no one source, on average, accounts for a full third of total 
revenues, indicating that discretion is likely determined by more factors than just funding 
sources.  This is consistent with public administration theory, which suggests that 
discretion is likely a function of organizational-, population- and individual-level factors.  
We hypothesized that discretion would be associated with an increase in the proportion of 
funding from local sources, based on interview data with LHOs that indicated that local 
funds carried few restrictions, as well as the conventional wisdom that federal funds are 
narrowly constrained to federal priorities. The regression models in this study, however, 
do not support our hypothesis.  While we did not find significant and positive coefficients 
on our variables for the proportion of local revenues in regression analyses, we did report 
two related findings.  First, as we reported in the previous chapter, locally governed 




LHOs managing locally governed LHDs report significantly higher levels of discretion 
than those governed at the state level.  These co-occurrences  suggest that further 
research focused on the relationship between discretion and local funding could be 
fruitful. 
Beyond managing financial resources, LHOs report the ability to reallocate nearly 
half of their personnel time and effort.  Clearly, this flexibility is dependent in large part 
on the skills, licensure and abilities of public health practitioners to work in a variety of 
areas.  For example, if a community had a greater need for specialized disease clinics 
than for maternal and child services, registered nurses may be able to move fairly easily 
between these different areas of practice.  If, however, there was great demand for 
environmental services, the skills of nurses and sanitarians are not so interchangeable.  
Even if funding structures allow certain redistribution of effort, practitioner-level 
limitations may preclude it.  Given that public health practice is labor intensive, 
discretion over nearly half of all personnel time and effort seems substantial.  It is likely 
that respondents also considered smaller scale redirection of tasks than those discussed 
here when answering this question.  
Multivariable and bivariate analyses of both %Funds and %Personnel indicating 
few significant associations between individual LHO-level variables (e.g., experience, 
education and gender), are consistent with Scott‟s (1997) work indicating that 
organization-level factors are more important in predicting discretion than individual-
level factors.  These analyses do indicate, however, the presence of an interesting 
association between per capita expenditures and discretion that is moderated by the 




associated with lower discretion.  This may be attributable in part to the public health 
financing structure; that is, LHDs draw revenues from the funding sources that are 
available to them, not necessarily from sources that are directly tailored to the public 
health needs of their communities.  So, if per capita expenditures increase due to more 
federal funding that is earmarked for specific activities and services, LHOs may have 
little discretion about how to allocate such funds.  In contrast, the presence of a BOH, 
especially one that may be highly policy oriented and proactive about ensuring adequate 
and appropriate funding for specific community needs, may influence the balance of 
revenue (and therefore the level of per capita expenditures) in ways that diminish the 
need to seek extra funding.  While we did not calculate the specific marginal effect of the 
interaction term (BOH x per capita expenditures) in our analyses, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and larger than the negative coefficient on per capita 
expenditures.  Further analyses of this data will include a calculation of the marginal 
effect of the interaction to better specify the magnitude of the moderating effect. 
Analyses of the third measure of discretion, Overall control, yielded quite 
different findings.  The multivariable analyses suggest a positive association between 
governance structure and control of allocation decisions – in other words, locally 
governed departments are associated with higher levels of LHO discretion.  While this 
may be an obvious finding, it does indicate that respondents likely interpreted this 
question much more broadly, and quite differently than those measuring %Funds and 
%Personnel, capturing a different aspect of the construct of discretion.  Our three 




conveys a somewhat different perspective on what it means for LHOs to have discretion 
in allocation  
Despite the differences among the three measures of discretion, all may be related 
to officials‟ abilities to ensure that public health needs in their communities are 
addressed.  As we hypothesized and as Student‟s t-tests and bivariate regressions indicate 
(i.e. analyses that do not control for any of the myriad factors associated with the ability 
to meet needs, such as demand for services and availability of community partners), all 
three measures of discretion are positively and significantly associated with our variable 
for %Needs Met.  If, in more nuanced analyses, higher discretion is further associated 
with the capacity to satisfy community needs, it may be important to gain an 
understanding for exactly what LHOs with more discretion do differently.  In other 
words, how is increased discretion operationalized in public health practice?  This finding 
may provide an additional salient factor in discussions about whether to encourage more 
centrally organized and executed public health activities and services.  A small but 
growing body of literature is beginning to build evidence that larger, more centralized 
LHDs may be doing a better job of executing the ten essential public health services 
(Bhandari, et al., 2008; Mays et al., 2006; Scutchfield et al., 2004), yet we see evidence 
that LHOs in small, decentralized LHDs have more discretion.  It will be important to ask 
precisely what is expected to be gained and lost by increasing centralization of these 
organizations.  Our finding may provide justification for further study of the role of 
discretion by local officials in meeting community public health needs.   
In her 2004 commentary titled, “There will never be enough money!” a local 




emphasized that “…implementation that is dependent on categorical funding cannot be 
easily or effectively shaped to meet the needs of the people we serve,” and implored 
public health practitioners to think creatively about how to spend the money in the public 
health system (Bailey, 2004, p.433).  Our measures of discretion may include a latent 
concept of creativity: the ability of a LHO to identify areas where changes in the ways 
resources are used may bring improvements to the system.  Some discretion scholars 
suggest that experimentation and stretching the limits can distinguish a successful from 
unsuccessful leader in an organization (Vaughn & Otenyo, 2007).  Rather than simply 
focus efforts on increasing the resources that go into the public health system, the 
findings in this study indicate that it may also be useful to assess creative and flexible 
reallocation schemes.  The LHOs who motivated this study argued that discretion could 
provide a “no cost” method for making improvements in public health practice.  
 
 Limitations and next steps 
 A central limitation in this and other studies using the 2008 Profile data is the 
concern for the quality of the revenue and expenditure data we employed.  We believe 
these data are central to understanding the construct of discretion in public health 
practice.  The Profile data are the best available and are rigorously compiled by an 
organization with the greatest knowledge about public health practice, but there are 
serious limitations in the capacities of LHDs to provide the data researchers need.  We 
did conduct our multivariate analyses on a subgroup of the data that was expected to be 




analyses will employ additional statistical methods (e.g., other forms of regression 
analyses) to try to improve the fit of our models to this data. 
Another limitation is that while over 80% of LHDs completed the NACCHO 
Profile survey, our resource allocation survey had a lower response rate of 53%.  Non-
respondents to our survey may differ from survey respondents in ways that are important 
to our study, such as their perceptions of the amount of discretion they have in their work.  
Our study design did not include a follow-up non-response survey, which would have 
given us an opportunity to determine whether there was such non-response bias on our 
measures of discretion.  We did, however, weight our data to adjust for differences in 
selection probability, response rates among the three size strata, and a post-stratification 
weight to ensure that our survey data was representative of our target population of all 
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Table 3.1: Discretion Variables by Size of the Population and Governance Structure 
 







Local Gov State Gov 
























       
Overall control  
 
    OR 4.55***  
  No control .02 .013 .004 .002 .015 .003 
  Small control .11 .082 .022 .006 .066 .044 
  Mod control .22 .137 .076 .008 .162 .059 
  Great deal  .53 .338 .168 .024 .485 .044 
Complete control .12 .095 .022 .004 .115 .006 
 
Figures for % Funds and % Personnel are means (s.e.).  
Figures for Overall control are proportions.   
The odds ratio was estimated using bivariate ordered logistic regression. 
 





         Table 3.2:    Variables Included in Regression Models 
 
Dependent Variables   Obs. Mean or 
proportion 
s.e. Range 
% Funds  592 32.07 1.38 0-100 
% Personnel time 595 48.01 1.67 0-100 
Overall control  591   1-5 
   1= No control  .02   
   2= Sml amt control  .11   
   3= Mod amt control  .22   
   4= Great deal control  .53   
   5= Complete control  .12   
% Needs Met  598 .60 .01 0-1 
     
Independent       
Variables 
    
 % Local (county/city) 444 .25 .01 0-1 
 Per capita expenditures 561 52.10 2.46 .98-333.91 
Years in position 604 10.07 .35 1-44 
% pop White 608 86.21 .68 1.03-99.42 
% pop Afr. Am. 608 6.61 .56 0-98.02 
% pop Am Ind/Alaskan  608 1.38 .29 0-77.22 
% pop Asian 608 1.56 .12 0-34.57 
% pop Haw./Other PI 608 .05 .004 0-1.05 
% LHD pop Other 608 2.57 .22 0-50 
     
Board approves LHD 
budget 1=yes 
605 .48 .02 0-1 
LHO gender, 1=female 608 .57 .02 0-1 
Governance, 1=local 
state=0 
608 .85 .02 0-1 
Board of Health 1=yes 608 .75 .02 0-1 
LHO Education 608    
   0=none  .07 .01 0-1 
   1=Associates degree  .04 .01 0-1 
   2=Bachelors degree  .34 .02 0-1 
   3=Masters degree  .40 .02 0-1 
   4=Doctoral degree  .15 .01 0-1 
     
Interaction terms     
BOH x Per Capita 
Expend. 





Table 3.3:  OLS Estimates of Two Discretion Variables: Log (Proportion of Funds) 
and Log (Proportion of Personnel Time) Officials can Reallocate 
 
 Ln % Funds Ln % Personnel time 
  
n=508   R
2
=.06 
Model F =.061 
(restricted) 
n=412   R
2
=.06 
Model F = .055 
 
n=520    R
2
=.09 
Model F =.000 
(restricted) 
n=421     R
2
=.11 
Model F = .000 
% Local revenues - .025 (.110) -.112 (.127) -.077 (.112) -005 (.130) 
Governance 
(1=local, 0=state) 
  .109 (.150)   .055 (.174) .010 (.161) -.016 (.181) 
Board of health 
(1= has a BOH) 
- .121 (.172) -.289 (.199) -.195 (.211) -.571** (.214) 
Per capita 
expenditures 
- .004* (.002) -.003 (.002) -.006** (.002) -.008** (.003) 
BOH* Per Capita 
expenditures 
  .005* (.002) .005+ (.003) .008** (.002) .011*** (.003) 








% of pop White    -.007 (.009) -.003 (.011) -.010 (.011) -.008 (.013) 
% of pop Afr Am.    -.005 (.009) -.0003 (.011) -.012 (.011) -.011 (.014) 
% of pop Am. 
Indian/Al. Native 
   -.009 (.012) -.006 (.014) -.018 (.013) -.016 (.016) 
% of pop Asian    -.013 (.016) -.010 (.019) .001 (.017) .001 (.018) 
% of pop Haw/PI      .310 (.478) .429 (.496) .364 (.552) .533 (.582) 
BOH authority to 
approve LHD 
budget 1=yes 
     .077 (.104) .130 (.118) .113 (.111) .190 (.115) 
Years in position .002 (.006) -.002 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.003 (.006) 
LHO gender 
1=female 
.172+ (.097)  .149  (.108) .192* (.096) .208+ (.107) 
LHO education 
(excluded = no 
degree) 
    
   Associates deg. .170 (.399) -.133 (.349) .115 (.256) .032 (.270) 
   Bachelors deg. .126 (.358) -.351 (.278) -.092 (.202) -.247 (.193) 
   Masters deg. -.070 (.364) -.604* (.277) -.311 (.203) -.496* (.195) 
   Doctoral deg. .026 (.382) -.484 (.297) -.322 (.228) -.521* (.225) 
Constant 3.47 (.935) 3.939 (1.153) 4.546 (1.056) 4.742 (1.301) 
+Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.        * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ***Statistically significant at the .1 percent level. 
 
Notes: 1) When the dependent variables are log-transformed , the interpretation is that dependent variable 
changes by approximately 100*(coefficient) percent for a one unit increase in the independent variable, 
holding all other variables constant (UCLA Academic technology services). 
2) The “restricted” models use only observations where the respondent replied that their financial system 
allowed them to distinguish between funds that originated from the state vs. from a federal source.  




Table 3.4:   Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) of LHOs’  
Overall Control in Allocation Decision Making 
 
 Odds Ratios (s.e.) 
 
  
n=539     Model F=.000 
(restricted) 
n=430    Model F=.004 
 
% Local revenues 1.456 (.344) 1.408 (.392) 
Governance 
(1=local, 0=state) 
4.395*** (1.225) 3.036** (.964) 
Board of health 
(1= has a BOH) 
.811 (.305) .744 (.330) 
Per capita expenditures 1.004 (.004) 1.003 (.004) 
BOH* Per capita 
expenditures 
1.000 (.005) 1.000 (.005) 




% of pop White 1.001 (.021) 1.007 (.027) 
% of pop Afr Am. .995 (.022) .995 (.027) 
% of pop Am.In./Ak. 
Native 
1.019 (.021) 1.012 (.028) 
% of pop Asian 1.00 (.037) 1.013 (.050) 
% of pop Haw/PI 8.38* (7.49) 5.325+ (4.562) 
BOH authority to 
approve LHD budget 
1=yes 
1.339 (.319) 1.122 (.305) 
LHO Years in position 1.008 (.012) 1.019 (.014) 
LHO gender 
1=female 
.874 (.182) .916 (.217) 
LHO Education 
excluded = no degree 
  
   Associates deg. 1.812 (1.072) 1.362 (1.070) 
   Bachelors deg. 1.984 (.996) 1.235 (.858) 
   Masters deg. 2.388+ (1.184) 1.116 (.771) 
   Doctoral deg. 2.338 (1.320) .879 (.005) 
 
+Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the .1 percent level 
 
Note: 1) Categories of overall control are 1=I have no control, 2=A small amount of 
control, 3=Moderate control, 4=A great deal of control, 5=Complete control 
2) The “restricted” model uses only observations where the respondent replied that their financial 





Table 3.5  
 







































 .66 .56 
Lead screening .65 .66 .62 .72 .62 .80** 
Emergency 
preparedness 
.68 .70 .64 .58 .66 .76 
Food establish 
inspection 




 M L 
  .79**
 S* L




 M L 
  .55**
 S** L
 .29 .68 .49** 
Oral health .23 .26**
 M
 .16 .14 .24 .19 
Behav. Risk 
surveillance 
.46 .46 .46 .42 .44 .58* 




 M L 
  .16**
 S* L
 .05 .24 .16 
 
Figures represent proportions. 
 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
*** Statistically significant at the .1 percent level. 
S, M, L 





Table 3.6:   Is Discretion in Funds Allocation Associated with Meeting 
Community Public Health Needs? 
 
 
Mean % of funds that can be reallocated 
 Needs Met Needs Not Met Difference in 
Means (s.e.) 
Adult immunization 33.28 30.2.1 3.07 (2.74) 
Lead screening 32.73 31.69 1.03 (2.79) 
Emergency preparedness 34.30 27.13 7.17 (2.64)** 
Food establish 
inspection 
31.60 33.57 -1.97 (3.79) 
Disease surveillance 33.39 27.74 5.64 (3.09)+ 
Blood pressure 
screening 
34.92 27.71 7.21 (2.76)** 
Oral health 38.64 30.07 8.58 (3.77)* 
Behav. risk surveillance 33.50 30.58 2.92 (2.87) 
Water inspection 33.76 26.76 7.00 (3.20)* 
Mental health 
prevention 
38.51 31.04 7.47 (3.97)+ 
Student’s t-tests compare means for Needs Met and Needs Not Met 
 
+ Statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 




Table 3.7: Is Discretion in Personnel Time Associated with Meeting 
Community Public Health Needs? 
 
Mean % of personnel time that can be reallocated 
 Needs Met Needs Not Met Difference in 
Means (s.e.) 
Adult immunization 47.78 45.29 2.49 (2.99) 
Lead screening 48.26 44.68 3.58 (3.04) 
Emergency 
preparedness 
48.98 43.45 5.53 (3.08)+ 
Food establish 
inspection 
47.39 45.58 1.81 (3.94) 
Disease surveillance 49.00 37.90 11.10 (3.82)** 
Blood pressure 
screening 
51.61 40.91 10.71 (3.02)*** 
Oral health 53.86 45.14 8.72 (3.66)* 
Behav. risk 
surveillance 
47.76 44.98 2.78 (3.01) 
Water inspection 48.31 43.00 5.30 (3.81) 
Mental health 
prevention 
51.24 46.28 4.95 (3.84) 
 
Students t-tests comparing means for Needs Met and Needs Not Met 
+ Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 





















* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 n Coefficient (s.e.) R
2
 
Log % Funds  552 .028* (.011) .02 
    
Log % Personnel time 569 .041** (.011) .03 
    
Overall control (excluded 
category = no control) 
587  .03 
   Sml amount of control  .059 (.084)  
   Moderate control  .046 (.078)  
   Great deal of control  .08 (.077)  







Ethical Issues in Pandemic Preparedness and Response: 




It is widely recognized that during a pandemic involving a highly virulent strain 
of influenza, demand for health care services will overwhelm existing health care 
systems.  Surges of patients will create demand for resources (e.g., antiviral medications, 
antibiotics and ventilators) beyond the capacity of most health care systems, necessitating 
difficult decisions about fair and equitable allocation of scarce resources.  Social 
distancing measures, such as home quarantine and school and business closures, will also 
likely be implemented during a pandemic to contain contagion.  These measures may 
limit personal freedoms and create serious ethical challenges for institutions and larger 
communities (Gostin, 2006; Schuklenk and Gartland, 2006; Thompson et al., 2006; 
Zhang, et al., 2006; Kotalik, 2005).  A coordinated and effective response to an influenza 
pandemic will require educated and trained health care professionals, well considered and 
clearly established health system protocols, as well as an informed populace.  Public 
engagement in difficult, ethically laden pandemic planning decisions may be an 
important factor in creating transparent processes, public trust in health care systems, 
voluntary compliance with public health orders, and ultimately, just outcomes. The 
literature on pandemic planning and response recognizes the need to engage the public in 
the planning process in order for policy makers to make ethically tenable decisions (Kass, 
N. et al., 2008; Keystone Center, 2007; Lemon et al., 2007; Thomas, 2007; DeCoster, 




Bioethics, 2005).  Yet despite this awareness in the literature, there have been limited 
opportunities to date for public participation in policy making related to pandemic 
preparedness.   
This study convened members of the public, in four focus group sessions, to 
consider and discuss two elements of pandemic planning and response: 1) issues of 
justice or fairness in the allocation of resources expected to be scarce during a pandemic; 
and 2) balancing individual liberties with public health interests in the implementation of 
social distancing measures to contain contagion during an influenza pandemic.  We 
aimed to gain a broad understanding of diverse points of view on challenging ethical 
questions for public health practitioners.  What criteria for deciding among population 
groups would community members see as legitimate, and which ethical principle should 
guide decision making?   How onerous will social distancing measures be for members of 
the community?  Will they see proposed interventions as valuable and will they be 
public-minded in their responses?   
We contribute to the literature on pandemic preparedness by adding citizens‟ 
perspectives on the expected impact of social distancing measures and scarce resource 
allocation.  In addition, we add to the limited literature on the value of public deliberation 
about ethical issues in public health practice. 
 
Background 
In recent years, agencies at all levels of government as well as private 
organizations have been developing pandemic response plans.  Major international 




groups to improve surveillance infrastructure and response efforts around the world.   In 
the U.S., the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for the overall 
national response strategy (U.S. DHS, 2006), while the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) is responsible for developing and updating the federal-level response 
plan (U.S. DHHS, 2005(a)).  States have all developed pandemic response plans as well.  
Both Federal and State plans are intended to clarify when and how resources will be used 
in a pandemic, and they offer broad guidance to local health officials largely responsible 
for executing the elements of response plans.  Embedded in these broad guidelines are 
provisions that create ethical challenges for local officials, as they must decide among 
individuals/population groups for the receipt of scarce resources, and must institute trade-
offs between public health goods and individual interests to contain contagion. 
Allocation of scarce resources.  Numerous pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical products are expected to be in short supply during a severe influenza 
pandemic.  Local health care systems and public health departments will likely be unable 
to meet the demand for antiviral medications, antibiotics, vaccines, ventilators and 
respirators, among other products.  While the federal Strategic National Stockpile (U.S. 
DHHS(d), CDC) is designed to quickly deliver some products to states and local areas 
when shortages occur, the Stockpile is not expected to meet the surge in demand 
immediately, and difficult allocation decisions will need to be made about which groups 
should receive priority for scarce supplies.  The current DHHS pandemic plan includes a 
prioritization scheme for the allocation of influenza vaccine, designed to guide local 
health officials and others who administer vaccine in the case of a shortage (U.S. DHHS, 




occupational and population categories and sets priorities among them, local health 
officials will nonetheless be left to make difficult decisions about which individuals in 
their communities qualify for each category.  The federal pandemic plan includes 
guidelines for the use of some other products expected to be scarce (e.g., antiviral 
medications), but does not detail priority groups as it does for vaccine allocation. 
Individual health systems, as well as local and state governments in the U.S., are working 
to design protocols for allocating other scarce products.   
A fair and just distribution of the benefits and burdens of public health resources 
is the broad goal of public health priority setting.  Various conceptions of justice and 
fairness are discussed in the literature, yet no one theory consistently guides priority 
setting procedures in public health (Daniels, 2001 and 1981).  Even the oft repeated 
principles associated with public health policy and practice -- utilitarianism and social 
justice (Gostin and Powers, 2006; Turnock, 2004; Levy, 1998; Krieger and Brin, 1998) – 
are not consistently used to guide allocation decisions, due in part to a wide variety of 
values underlying public health practitioners‟ decision making (Baum et al., 2009).   A 
utilitarian approach to allocation (e.g., using cost-effectiveness analyses) would strive to 
maximize net benefits to the population under consideration.  Such approaches put 
relatively little emphasis on the actual distribution of benefits, and therefore would not 
single out particular groups to receive scarce public health services or products.  Gostin 
and Powers (2006) suggest that social justice in public health means striving for a fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens, focusing efforts on disadvantaged sectors of a 
community.  An allocation approach that aimed to improve social justice might provide 




Distinct from utilitarian and social justice approaches, an egalitarian approach might 
strive to provide the same level of resources across all population groups.  Without an 
agreed upon conception of justice, it is difficult for policy makers or local public health 
officials to know when they are making ethically challenging decisions effectively.  
Social distancing measures.  In the event of an influenza pandemic, an effective 
vaccine will not be available until many months after the virus is identified.  During these 
early weeks and months, public health officials will likely implement a variety of social 
distancing measures to contain contagion and to reduce morbidity and mortality in 
communities.  Health officials will have the legal authority to close businesses and 
schools, prohibit public gatherings, limit travel and institute quarantine.  In 2007, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued guidelines to assist communities in 
implementing such interventions (U.S. DHHS(c), CDC, 2007).  Importantly, these 
guidelines also include a pandemic severity index to help match the level of intervention 
with the case fatality rate of the pandemic.  Under the scenario of a severe pandemic, the 
guidelines recommend that health officials close schools for as much as three months, 
and that businesses and other organizations may need to substantially alter the ways they 
function.  Isolation and voluntary home quarantine will be encouraged for those who are 
ill or have been exposed to others who are ill.  It is clear that effective implementation of 
such potentially onerous interventions will require a great deal of cooperation from 
individuals and organizations in the community.  Many will confront work and childcare 
challenges, including supervision of healthy young children, maintaining isolation of 
teenagers and caring for children who become ill.  In a national survey conducted in 




found that most respondents said they would comply with proposed social distancing 
measures, but 57% expressed serious concern about jobs and finances if business closures 
were sustained for one month.  Sixty percent of respondents said that if schools were 
closed for one month, at least one employed family member would have to stay home 
from work.   
Social distancing measures will clearly limit personal freedoms, and may do so 
for large numbers of people and for extended periods of time.  Public health officials 
must strike a balance when interventions designed to attain community benefits work at 
the expense of individual freedoms.  (Although such restrictions may have some positive 
effects for individuals, they are primarily implemented to protect and sustain the health of 
the greater community.)  The legal and policy principle of proportionality
12
 is one 
standard that public health officials seek to maintain in order to achieve this balance.  
That is, officials strive to employ only as much burden on individuals or communities as 
is necessary to achieve the public health goal at hand, in this case containment or 
mitigation of disease (Gostin, 2000).  We have, however, had limited experience 
employing the proposed social distancing measures in the U.S., and thus are limited in 
both our evidence of their effectiveness and our knowledge of the real burdens they will 
impose when implemented.  The field of public health highly values scientific evidence 
of effectiveness of policies and practices.  Unfortunately, social distancing measures have 
generally lacked strong empirical validation of effectiveness (Bartlett and Borio, 2008; 
Aledort et al., 2008; WHO, 2006).   
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   According to Gostin (2005), the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts established four standards that must 
be maintained to balance government regulation with consideration for individual liberty in public health: 
necessity; reasonable means; proportionality; and harm avoidance.  The concept of proportionality ensures 
that the burdens associated with a public health intervention are not “wholly disproportionate” to the 




Public engagement.  When neither the science of public health nor the principles 
of justice are sufficient to resolve allocation issues or to determine which policies to 
implement, it may be valuable to engage the public in the decision making process.  
Public health academics and practitioners have vast knowledge and experience in the 
science of public health practice, yet they have no more moral authority to make value 
judgments than do members of the public.   When policy decisions require ethical 
judgments, public involvement in the decision making process may engender trust in 
policymakers, which may be important when individuals are asked to do burdensome 
things, such as abide by allocation decisions that may not work in their favor (Lenaghan, 
1999). It may help policy makers gain a deeper understanding about the expected burdens 
associated with the policies they propose, and may offer valuable insights into citizens‟ 
preferences for policies or principles to guide policies when science is not enough to 
determine the answers. Public involvement in policy decisions can occur in a number of 
ways.   
One approach that holds promise is democratic deliberation.  Deliberative 
procedures involve representative groups in informed discussions about issues that 
directly affect them (Abelson, Eyles, et al., 2003; Ableson, Forest, et al., 2003).   A 
central tenet of deliberation is that free and equal individuals, often with dissimilar 
perspectives, join together in discussion with the opportunity to gain a deeper 
understanding of policy issues and the various contexts, understandings and points of 
view, and possibly reach a consensus on a recommended course of action.   
Egalitarian principles of deliberation form the basis for equal opportunities for 




work together as equals (Elster, 1998; Manin et al., 1987). When participants of equal 
moral standing disagree about issues, they may be able to maintain mutual respect for one 
another in a deliberative process (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002). Individual views may 
change based on the arguments of others (Miller, 2003) and individuals with disparate 
views on an issue may be able to agree on what is fair or what is in the common interest.    
Deliberation may lead individuals to empathize with others and may encourage those 
who disagree to “…set aside their adversarial, win-lose approach and understand that 
their fate is linked with the fate of the other….” (Mendelberg, 2001, p.2)  Such processes 
may bring individuals together to create a coordinated effort to achieve societal goals.  
Gutmann and Thompson suggest that deliberative procedures encourage “public-spirited” 
perspectives.  Such perspectives do not erase self-interest, but allow individuals a broader 
view of others‟ positions (1997, p. 39)  It is, in part, this capacity for bringing about 
public-spirited views that makes deliberative processes particularly well suited for 
addressing the difficult, value-laden public health issues raised in pandemic planning and 
response.  
Deliberative procedures are not expected to guarantee particular outcomes.  
Indeed, different groups deliberating about the same issues may put forth dissimilar 
recommendations or make different decisions about what constitutes a just outcome.  But 
to some scholars, the process of deliberation is expected to do more than simply 
contribute to better decisions; it may be necessary to reach truly just decisions.  Through 
deliberation, individuals consent to certain decisions that affect them, and transparent, 
explicit reasoning typical of deliberative processes allows this type of consent (Fleck, 




process that governs them is a powerful attestation to the principle of respect for 
individuals.  Deliberative procedures may involve a type of dialogue with policy makers 
or community officials in which officials must also share reasons for their actions or 
decisions.  Such public explanation or justification is expected to improve the 
accountability of decision-makers to the participants or to the community at large 
(Eriksen and Fossum, 2002).  Public discourse, along with leaders‟ justification of policy 
decisions, may help increase the legitimacy of a decision and public trust in the decision-
making process (Lenaghan, 1999).  In fact, many believe that the costs of not involving 
the public in the examination of ethical challenges could be severe.  Inadequate attention 
to public perceptions of allocation policies or social distancing measures could lead 
policymakers to lose legitimacy and, more importantly, the public‟s trust.  This could, in 
turn, lessen the effectiveness of policies such as public health response plans during a 
pandemic (Thompson, et al., 2006; Perhac, 1998). 
13
  
Deliberative processes have great intuitive appeal but they are not, as yet, 
frequently employed in the U.S. health care system (Ginsberg et al., 2006; Perhac, 1998). 
In 2006, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, along with the CDC 
and other organizations conducted a public engagement project with approximately 400 
organized stakeholders and members of the public, from four geographic areas in the 
U.S., to discuss the trade-offs associated with social distancing measures likely to be 
imposed during a pandemic.  They found that approximately two-thirds of their 
participants supported proposed social distancing measures.  Participants identified four 
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 There are some important arguments against deliberative processes as well.  See Rowe and Frewer, 
(2000), for a discussion of the difficulty in achieving representativeness.  See Dworkin, (1984), for 
consideration of the argument that procedures do not guarantee fair outcomes.  Powers and Faden (2000) 
go beyond worrying about a bad outcome and suggest that there is a substantial risk that deliberation will 




general challenges associated with such measures: the soundness of the planning, the 
economic impact, the information needs of the public and the social stresses that would 
be created (Keystone, 2007).   In 2005, the CDC along with other organizations hosted a 
similar public engagement project to identify and set priorities among goals for a national 
pandemic response plan (Keystone, 2005).  In addition, in 2007 the federal government 
hosted a web dialogue, encouraging input from the public during the design of the federal 
vaccine allocation guidelines.  The web dialogue included over 400 participants whose 
input was used to modify the guidelines (U.S. DHHS (f) and U.S. DHS, 2008).
14
  The 
federal government also regularly posts proposed policy changes in the Federal register to 
solicit comments from the public as well as interest groups and other organizations.  
Academic researchers in other countries are also beginning to encourage public discourse 




In July and August of 2008, we convened four focus groups with members of the 
public from four counties in Southeast Michigan
15
 to assess: 1) their input about 
processes to allocate scarce resources; and 2) their willingness to accept measures 
(commonly called “social distancing measures”) intended to control contagion and reduce 
morbidity and mortality in an influenza pandemic. Each group was made up of eight to 
ten adults, and lasted approximately 90 minutes.  We conducted two of the meetings in 
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 The guidelines document does not include any assessment of whether web dialogue differed in any 
important ways from in-person deliberations. 
15
 The four counties included Washtenaw, Livingston, Wayne and Monroe.  These four counties make up 
the Region 2 South Medical Bio-Defense Network in Michigan.  This network is funded by a federal 




public libraries, one in a county community center, and one at the University of Michigan 
School of Public Health.
16
  
We recruited participants by distributing flyers directly to daycare centers and 
places of worship, and by posting flyers in public venues including retail stores, coffee 
shops, libraries and community centers.  We posted electronic messages on craigslist 
(www.Craigslist.org) and ran advertisements in the Detroit Free Press and the Monroe 
Daily News.  Groups were selected to include some participants who were employed, and 
some who were parenting young children (school-age, or in pre-school or daycare) in 
order to generate rich discussion about the effects of pandemic response policies on the 
workplace, and the level of support for school and daycare closure during a pandemic.  
Participants were offered a $25 Visa gift card and a box dinner for their participation. 
After thorough review of the literature on social distancing measures likely to be 
implemented during a pandemic, we developed a focus group discussion protocol which 
included questions about resource allocation and social distancing measures (Bloor et al., 
2001; Barbour and Kitzsinger, 1999; Greenbaum, 1998).  Broad questions were followed 
by probes to explore participants‟ comments and arguments. A professional facilitator led 
the participants in discussion. Discussion opened with factual questions asked in a round-
robin fashion, about length of residency in the county and previous experiences with 
disasters  to engage all participants early in the session.  Participants were then given a 
short (approximately 10 minute) educational session about influenza and pandemics, the 
expected surge in demand on the health care system and shortage of resources such as 
antiviral medications and ventilators, as well as a description of the social distancing 
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measures likely to be implemented during a virulent pandemic.   Participants were 
encouraged to ask questions and clarification was provided where possible.  The 
facilitator encouraged participants to discuss their reactions to proposed methods for 
allocation of scarce resources and social distancing measures likely to be implemented 
during a pandemic, and to respond to one another‟s comments.  All focus group 
discussions were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Following the focus group sessions 
participants were contacted via email or telephone to gather demographic information.  
[See Table 4.1 for participant characteristics.]   [See Appendix 4.A for Discussion 
Protocol.  See Appendix 4.B for Educational Handout.]  
We conducted qualitative, thematic analysis of the focus group discussion data 
(Creswell, 2006; Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Mason, 2002; Patton, 2001; Krueger, 
1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Weber, 1990).   After multiple readings of the 
transcripts, two researchers (NMB and SDG) developed a codebook to analyze the data 
systematically.  The codebook was developed by inductively classifying emergent themes 
into categories of codes.  We established inclusion and exclusion criteria and provided 
relevant examples for each code.  We developed the codes interactively following close 
reading and comparison of the text, and discussed together the new themes and sub-
themes suggested by the data.  Two researchers (NMB and REK) then coded all four 
focus group transcripts independently.  After coding two of the four transcripts coders 
compared decisions.  Differences in coding decisions were discussed until agreement was 
reached.  The codebook was modified to reflect new insights, and all four transcripts 




NVIVO 8 software to facilitate nuanced analyses (QSR International, 2008). [See 
Appendix 4.C for Codebook]    
 
Results 
Of the 37 focus group participants, 81% were employed and 51% were parenting 
school or pre-school age children.  Seventy-three percent were female, and the mean age 
was 43 years.  The racial composition was 72% Caucasian, 25% African American, 3% 
American Indian and 3% Other, with all participants self-identifying all race categories 
that applied.  Only 15% were health care workers, and 25% were uninsured within one 
year of the focus group sessions. 
In group discussions, participants appeared to understand the potential morbidity 
and mortality risks associated with an influenza pandemic. Indeed, they expressed fear 
quite openly during their immediate responses following the pandemic information 
session.  One participant said, “…it takes months to develop the vaccine but it‟s in hours 
that it‟s going to happen, so it doesn‟t seem like it matches up very well, so it‟s pretty 
scary.”  Throughout the discussions, participants recognized the complexity of the 
decision making leaders will face planning for and responding to a pandemic.  One 
woman shared, “I‟m grateful not to have to make these decisions.”  Another commented, 
“I don‟t know how you determine who deserves to die….”  Others talked about the need 
for coordination among health systems and geographic areas to ensure effectiveness of 






Impact of Social Distancing Measures Likely Employed during a Pandemic 
Despite their appreciation for the complexity of a pandemic response plan, 
participants expressed many concerns about the economic and other burdens associated 
with proposed social distancing measures such as the closing of schools, businesses and 
religious organizations.   
Economic burdens. Immediate economic needs, job security, the need for essential 
goods and services, and long-term effects on the economy from extended business or 
school closure or quarantine were among concerns addressed in all four group 
discussions. For example, several parents, especially in two groups held in lower-
income communities, viewed staying home from work to care for children during 
school or daycare closures as a “luxury” not all families could afford and still “pay the 
bills.” Similarly some
17
 worried that staying home from work, either to care for 
children or for illness, could lead to loss of a job: 
 
Right now a lot of people are afraid of losing their jobs so they work while 
they‟re sick. They‟re pushing themselves afraid of losing their jobs if they 
don‟t show up, so I think there would have to be some kind of legal, 
something legal in place so fear would not put people in the worst way. 
 
Participants readily identified elements of the economy, such as grocery stores, as 
important societal infrastructure that must be maintained during other closures. Many 
feared that extended closure of schools or businesses would irreparably damage an 
already fragile economy.  One participant said:  
 
If you shut down the schools though, you‟ve basically shut down the 
economy because you‟d have to have, then people would have to stay 
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home so you‟re affecting a lot more than people getting sick, you‟ve just 
affected a huge financial workings to the bulk of the country. That‟s a 
big decision. 
 
Some feared that economic pressures to go to work would lead to unsafe situations, 
such as children left home unattended, or would further spread disease by unsupervised 
teenagers intent on socializing despite school or business closures.  One mother added: 
 
My high schooler will not stay home. I mean she would not self stay 
home or allow me to tell her to stay home. … she‟s got work to do, stuff 
to do … so that‟s from a parent of an older kid. It won‟t work (laughs). 
 
 
Imminent threat.  All groups discussed the need to have compelling reasons to endure 
the inconvenience or hardships such social distancing measures would bring.  In light of 
the expected economic burdens associated with social distancing measures, participants 
expressed a need to know that threat of a disease was imminent and severe before 
agreeing to comply with policies that would likely be onerous and disruptive.    One 
participant said, “Well it would be total chaos if we start shutting down things before we 
know hard core facts.” Another commented: 
 
…that right now it‟s in some third world country and it may come here. I 
don‟t think that‟s going to be good enough. I think there‟s going to have 
to be some indication that it is actually in your own community before 
you take steps as drastic as shutting down anything.  
 
 
 Religious concerns. In all four groups some participants shared opposition to mandatory 
closure of religious organizations during a pandemic.  They cited the importance of 
religious communities for support, for opportunities to worship and pray together during 





I don‟t know, I think people should have the choice if they need to go to 
church for whatever reason at this time, this kind of thing and they‟re 
going to make the choice I guess to go out. That might be a place that they 
need to go. 
 
Another man shared: 
I personally feel that churches, temples, synagogues whatever, should 
remain open.  I mean if it‟s a pandemic and there‟s marshall law imposed, 
you know, the populous is going to be in a panic, in a state of collapse, 
and people are going to turn to their, in large numbers, turn to their faith 
to sustain them …they‟re going to want to be gathering. 
 
Participants also shared concerns that religious gatherings may be important venues for 
information-sharing during times when community fear is high.  Some wanted religious 
institutions to have the freedom to choose whether to remain open during a pandemic.  
One participant commented, “Seems like those places would make the decision 
themselves to close though, rather than having the government tell them they have to 
close down.”  The financial fragility of religious organizations was also a concern, with 
mandatory closure seen as a financial hardship for many institutions.   
In contrast, a small minority of participants argued in support of the closing of 
churches, synagogues and mosques during a pandemic, considering religious gatherings 
to be voluntary activities and environments conducive for transmission of infectious 
diseases.  One participant shared the following perspective: 
 
…you cannot allow people to come together because it will cause more 
fatalities and then they‟ll go to the health care workers. The health care 
workers will be dropping like flies in a true pandemic and you cannot, you 
have to disallow any group meetings or you will just continue to spread 
the virus. It‟s a very cold thing to say, I realize that but it‟s a very realistic 







Allocation of Resources Expected to be Scarce in a Pandemic 
Participants were asked to consider the basis on which to decide who will have 
priority for scarce resources, given the expected surge in demand on the health care 
system during a pandemic and the resultant shortages of antiviral medication, ventilators, 
vaccine and other necessary resources.   
Determining priority for allocation.  None of the four focus groups reached consensus 
about which population group should have first priority, nor about a guiding principle 
that should drive such decision making.  Participants considered the merit of allocation 
schemes such as first-come-first served and lottery systems.  They discussed who would 
be more likely to benefit from a scarce resource (e.g., most likely to survive if given an 
antiviral medication), who would be hardest hit by the virus, and who would benefit the 
most from a given resource.   
“…You find the person most likely to survive their wounds, or in this case their 
disease and you treat them aggressively.  If somebody is, if somebody‟s 50 years 
old and is a smoker and has bird flu, you know, you go back and treat the 25 year 
old that‟s an athlete and has the bird flu because he‟s got more of a chance than 
the 50 year old.” 
 
In each of the four focus groups, some participants favored giving children 
highest priority.  Children were favored both because they are considered to be 
vulnerable to disease and because they have not yet had an opportunity to live a long 
life.
18
   One woman said: 
“…I‟ve been through enough.  I‟m happy with what I‟ve been through and seen 
what I needed to see, and if it means that you know, a child can go on living, more power 
to them.” 
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Some participants in each of the four groups favored giving health care workers 
priority over all other groups.  Priority to this group was justified mainly for the utility 
health care workers would provide in caring for the large numbers of people who will 
need care during a pandemic. 
“People in the health care industry, people that are going to help… people who 
are sick, get better.  You know, anybody who has the ability to do that can be first 
on the list to be taken care of first.” 
 
Similarly, all four groups reflected on the value of those who maintain the infrastructure 
that maintains the functioning of society.  First responders, the police, military personnel, 
morticians and some scientists (e.g., those who make vaccine) were all considered in 
discussions.   
Two group discussions included consideration of those who should have lowest 
priority for scarce resources, such as criminals or prisoners.  One woman asked, “Should 
we really save the life of a guy in prison or whatever?  What if he is a killer or seriously 
mentally ill?   This led others to voice broad objections to allocation policies based on 
social value because of the difficulty in determining such value.  Some also expressed 
nuanced concerns related to the role social worth might play in allocation schemes: 
“…this probably won‟t go over well but I thought, „Oh great, I‟m a middle-aged 
single woman.  I would never get vaccine or anything because I‟m considered 
obsolete and who would take care of me because I don‟t have you know, optimum 
health insurance or anything else,‟ and because when I‟m sick, I generally do 
have to take care of myself…” 
 
Two participants suggested that setting priorities among individuals and groups was too 
difficult because, they argued, all lives have inherently equal value. 
Emphasis on fairness.  Early in all four group discussions participants addressed the 




discussions of the ability to pay for needed services, insurance status, the ability to bribe 
and other unfair advantages the rich would have over the poor.   
“She said that about the rich getting it and immediately I think…there will be a 
black market.  I mean then they‟ll get their antivirals, irregardless[sic] whether 
they‟re paying it at the hospital or whether they‟re paying it on the street, they‟ll 
be getting it.” 
 
Participants suspected that those involved in manufacturing vaccines or antiviral 
medications would have early access to supplies of them and would take what they 
needed for themselves and for their families.  Other concerns included allocation among 
racial groups and for vulnerable populations such as the homeless.  One man said, “…I 
think you have to separate it fairly among the races.  I mean it‟s not just who‟s in 
power…”     
 
Philosophical justification for allocation.  Participants in the four groups used two main 
philosophical justifications for their allocation recommendations.  Many made utilitarian 
arguments that emphasized allocation approaches that were best for society.  They 
suggested that health care workers, police and military personnel should have priority for 
vaccine or antiviral medications so that they could “care for the rest of the people” and 
maintain the functioning of society.  Classic utilitarian-based triage arguments were made 
to support provision of scarce resources to those who were “most likely to survive” a 
pandemic or to those who would require fewer resources in order to survive.  
Egalitarian arguments included favoring the use of a lottery or per capita 
distributions of scarce resources, and generally treating everyone alike.  These arguments 
were supported by reasoning that emphasized giving each member of society an “equal 




get what they needed” and complained that they were not comfortable giving preference 
to any particular group.  One woman said, “I‟m really not comfortable with this [line of 
argument] because I feel like we are playing who is more important than someone else.”  
Egalitarian arguments often followed discussion about determining which groups in the 
community would be most important for maintaining the functioning of society. 
Beyond utilitarian and egalitarian arguments, participants supported other views 
with arguments that were less consequentialist in nature.  Some argued that those who 
were the most vulnerable
19
 members of society should have priority for scarce resources.  
Often they spoke of those who were unable to care for themselves (e.g., children) or those 
who were the sickest (e.g., those with underlying chronic conditions) as groups that 
should have priority over others.  These were often the first groups to be identified for 
priority by focus group participants.  Other participants also made “fair innings” or 
lifespan arguments to prioritize the young over the old (Daniels, 1996).  Many noted that 
members of society would likely act in self-interested ways during a crisis such as a 
pandemic, but none attempted to justify such acts.  
 
Broad Themes  
 
Common throughout the discussions about social distancing measures and the 
allocation of scarce resources were broad themes of public-spirited attitudes, desire for 
opportunities for public input into policy processes, and distrust of the government. 
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Public-spirited attitudes and public involvement. Group discussions elicited 
recognition of an extant duty not to infect others if exposed or sick with influenza. They 
spoke of the interconnectedness of individuals in communities, and discussed the 
importance of modifying personal routines “for the good of everybody else.”  One 
woman said, “During an emergency like this, community will be the only thing – we can‟t 
remain isolated to cut our losses.”  Some commented on the design of pandemic 
response policies and the importance of keeping the larger community in mind.  One 
participant noted that necessary policies may not be popular: 
I agree there has to be a plan and that plan has to be stuck to, no matter 
what but the plan can‟t be created based on popularity and what, you 
know, what will make the most people happy because what will make the 
most people happy is certainly not the common good. 
 
Some suggested that policymakers should be “selfless” in designing and implementing 
community action plans, and that plans must not cater to individual interests but must 
be designed with broad community goals in mind.    
In contrast, participants in three of the four groups acknowledged that strong self-
interest often holds sway during public disasters. This contributed to comments both 
about the self-interest of others (e.g., those who manufacture antiviral medications taking 
some “off the top” for their own families) and their own intense desires to keep their 
loved ones safe.  One woman remarked: 
We always think of self first and that‟s being real about it. I‟m not 
thinking about if you going to be okay… I mean frankly speaking, you 
know, that‟s being honest and right then and there, we‟re not thinking 
about let me save the world. 
 
 Participants shared a desire for accessible and accurate information about limiting 




received any information about pandemic preparedness from their local health 
department or knew of any recent educational efforts within their communities.
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  “Make 
a plan and stick to it,” said one participant, and that included, for her, making sure the 
public knew the plan.  Others implored policy makers to provide opportunities for 
community input.  One woman said, “Focus groups are important.  Listen to the average 
citizens.  If there are task forces, citizens should be on each task force.” Another 
emphasized the importance of opportunities for public input adding, “Listen to the 
people.  Groups like this are important.  The public have well meaning opinions that the 
policy makers may not know.  Listen to the people.” 
  
Distrust in government.  Despite desires for public input and public education, 
participants in all of our focus groups, which were held in well-off, low-income and 
middle class communities and included participants from underrepresented minorities, 
articulated distrust of government.  They did not distinguish between federal, state or 
local governments, but participants in two groups referred to “politicians,” clearly 
referring to elected officials, whereas others referred more broadly to “the government.”  
Participants suggested that politicians would do the politically expedient thing rather than 
what is right in a crisis, and that public officials may not always convey accurate 
information to the public.  Participants expressed skepticism that politically difficult 
decisions would trump desires for re-election, and that politicians would, like others, be 
looking out for themselves by seeking special treatment, as indicated in this comment: 
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With the government, we already know, they‟re going to know and they‟re 
not going to let us know until a week or two later, after the outbreak has 
already started so you know, they‟re going to get their‟s and they‟ll be 
vaccinated. They‟re going to make sure their families are taken care of. 
 
 Participants emphasized the importance of involving citizens in plan development and 
enforcement of response plans without undue influence from interest groups.   
In contrast, one participant spoke positively of a governmental role in controlling 
an expected surge in demand for scarce resources (in this case, antiviral medications).  
 
Process of deliberation.  Although the focus group sessions were limited to 90 minutes, 
including a brief education session, we were able to identify signs that, even in such a 
short period of time, participants were capable of deliberating about important public 
health issues.  Participants considered difficult public policy issues, listened to others‟ 
perspectives, agreed and disagreed with one another, and at times appeared to have 
influenced fellow participants‟ positions (Gutmann and Thompson, 1997).  For example, 
when asked whether they would support the mandatory closing of religious institutions 
during a pandemic, these three participants shared different points of view, justified their 
positions, and considered others‟ positions: 
A: …I think people should have the choice if they need to go to church for 
whatever reason… 
 
B: I disagree…you cannot allow people to come together because it will cause 
more fatalities and then they‟ll go to the health care workers.  The health care 
workers will be dropping like flies…you have to disallow any group meetings or 
you will continue to spread the virus…. 
 
C: I personally feel that churches, temples, synagogues whatever should remain 
open…people are going to turn to their, in large numbers, turn to their faith to 
sustain them…But you know, to temper that, there should be some communication 




public and you need to be warned against it, but I don‟t think that you can tell 
somebody that they can‟t go to church… 
 
It was clear that participants often considered their own positions on issues in light of 
others‟ perspectives, as evidenced by phrases such as, “…I think that is a weak area for 
many of the reasons that Mary Ellen said.” and “Well, going against the grain too, I‟m 
skeptical…” and “I think building on kind of what you were saying too Matt, I think…”   
When asked to consider how policymakers should decide who receives scarce resources 
during a pandemic, participants in one group ruled out one option (decision-making by 
lottery) through discussion: 
A: I don‟t know, how crazy would the thought of a lottery be…so that you‟re not 
picking anybody over somebody else for whatever reason? 
 
B: But would you wait until the emergency happened to make that 
decision…every decision has to be made prior to the event happening…I‟m not 
saying it would be bad but it would have to be done like this year so that when it 
happened in a couple years, then that lottery ticket would become a commodity. 
 
A: …what if your three kids got the lottery and the parents did not or something 
like that. 
 
 C: …you create a lottery, it creates it‟s own problems. 
 
 A:  Yeah, it would be, (laughs) just a thought. 
 
D: Your value to society, you have to come in there, it can‟t just be as plain as you 




This study grapples with questions of fairness and equity in the distribution of 
public resources as well as burdens and benefits associated with social distancing 




the complexity of dealing with an unpredictable contagious disease, and puts to the test 
the emergency preparedness efforts, including for pandemics, that have figured 
prominently in public health departments since September 2001.   
With limited information, for instance about mortality rates, and varying legal 
authority in communities to implement social distancing measures, public health 
responses to this virus varied (Hodge, 2009).  Numerous communities closed schools and 
other public venues. Differing responses on the part of public administrators and a 
spectrum of news reports about the threat (or lack thereof) from H1N1 tend to be mirrored 
in public reactions, which may range from excessive fear of contagion to beliefs that “it‟s 
just the „flu” and that the government‟s reaction is overblown. Information campaigns 
exhort the public to stay home if they are ill, avoid contact with others who appear ill, 
avoid crowded venues, avoid unnecessary travel (in the case of H1N1 usually to Mexico), 
and maintain a “safe distance” from everyone.  At least one state added the threat of fines 
to pressure people to stay home (Hochberg, 2009).   
Differences in community responses are likely due, in part, to the lack of clear 
evidence on the effectiveness and optimal use of social distancing measures. Experts 
advocate school and other closures based on the best available evidence, as well as past 
experiences with other infectious diseases, but in the face of uncertainty about contagion 
and virulence of a novel infectious agent, judgments about timing and duration of 
closures will vary.  Valuable historical research conducted by Markel and colleagues 
sheds some important light on the question of effectiveness.  They found that during the 
1918-1919 pandemic, which was both highly contagious and virulent, those cities with 




Such interventions were intended not just to reduce attack rates and mortality, but also to 
slow transmission, which today might also provide society time to prepare vaccines, 
disperse antiviral medication, and bolster response plans in communities not yet infected 
(Markel et al., 2007).  Yet it is precisely the extended time period of social distancing 
measures that worried so many of our participants.  They discussed their concerns in the 
context of their everyday lives -- concerns about job stability, financial fragility and their 
abilities to truly keep children and teens in safe, isolated environments.  These social and 
financial concerns are consistent with findings from a national survey conducted by 
Blendon and colleagues in 2006, which informed the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention‟s recommendations for community nonpharmaceutical interventions (Blendon 
et al., 2008; U.S. CDC, 2007). 
Such economic concerns are justified, not only because so many in Michigan and 
other places in the country are experiencing high unemployment rates and are in tenuous 
financial condition, but also because currently there is no program to provide income 
support to individuals who are out of work for an extended period of time as a result of a 
pandemic or other public health disaster.  Pandemic response plans in some other 
countries, such as Australia, include provisions for income assistance to individuals who 
suffer lost income due to a pandemic (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).  During the 
SARs outbreak in Canada in 2003  the Ontario government instituted some financial 
assistance and job protections for individuals who lost income due to their own 
quarantine or their need to care for a family member who was quarantined (Reis, 2004; 
Government of Ontario, 2003). Workers with young children may lose their jobs if 




children.  The Family Medical Leave Act may offer job security if a family member has a 
serious health condition, but there will be a great many healthy children who will need 
supervision and whose parents would not meet the Act‟s criteria (U.S. DHHS (e)).  The 
economic concerns we heard from our participants should serve as a caution to policy 
makers about public willingness to comply with sustained social distancing measures. 
Policy makers must address such concerns to effectively implement and sustain social 
distancing measures during a pandemic.  Future research should examine the impact of 
government provision of financial assistance on the public‟s support for social distancing 
measures. 
Participants‟ perceptions of what constitutes an imminent infectious disease threat 
may be tied to their concerns about job security as well.  Many suggested that disease 
must be present in their own communities before they would accept or support business, 
school or religious closures.  While this requirement for close proximity seems 
financially prudent, it may ultimately put communities at greater risk of infection and 
compromise their abilities to minimize the negative impacts of the disease, including on 
the economy.  Indeed this tension was recognized by participants.  One participant with 
an infant in daycare commented that she would likely keep her child home from daycare 
even if their particular setting was not officially closed due to a pandemic, to further 
reduce her child‟s risk of infection.  At least one participant in each of the groups shared 
intentions to voluntarily keep their school-age children home in the event of a pandemic, 
even if their childrens‟ schools were not officially closed.  Further empirical assessment 
of public reaction to the early 2009 H1N1 outbreak will be important to gauge expected 




The findings from this study reveal at least two broad ethical challenges with 
which policy makers must contend to ensure that public health responses to a pandemic 
are just.  The first is the tension between protecting personal autonomy and promoting 
community well-being.  To what extent should public health officials implement home 
quarantine or mandate business, school or religious closures to reduce the spread of 
influenza in a community?  The well-being of a community is not simply the aggregated 
health status of individuals within the community, but is also the economic and social 
environments in which those individuals live.  Any community-wide public health effort 
to manage an influenza pandemic must then balance the effort to contain contagion with 
the other important community needs for viable businesses and religious organizations. 
There is a long history in public health policy and practice of restricting individual rights 
when needed to reduce health risks to a community, such as vaccination requirements for 
school entry and limitations on smoking in public places.  Out of respect for individual 
freedoms, however, these restrictions are not employed lightly.  For example, mandatory 
closure of private entities during a pandemic may even require a declaration of an 
emergency before public health officials have the authority to execute such restrictions.  
The free exercise of religion has special status in our society, as set out in the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so it is not surprising that many participants in our 
focus groups had strong reactions to the possibility of mandatory closure of religious 
institutions.  Closing religious institutions in response to a pandemic may thus prove to 
be particularly challenging for health officials. Participants in our groups emphasized the 
importance of religious gatherings during times of crisis, suggesting that contingency 




considered.  Given the skepticism and distrust of government many of our participants 
expressed, restrictions on religious observance, which could offend or anger citizens 
during a time in which they already feel threatened, could prove to be a significant 
hurdle. It will be important for public health leaders to not only communicate with 
religious organizations but also to coordinate their actions with those of religious leaders.  
While public health laws officially give authority to public health officers in 
communities, unofficially officials should find ways to present shared authority with 
religious leaders to maximize community compliance. 
The second ethical challenge highlighted by our findings concerns the need to 
ensure that the benefits and burdens associated with proposed policy actions are 
distributed fairly.  Policy makers will need to ensure that vulnerable populations do not 
disproportionately shoulder unfair burdens (e.g., high rates of job loss) or receive fewer 
benefits (e.g., lower use of antiviral medication) than other groups, due to the 
implementation of social distancing measures or to particular elements of allocation 
schemes.  The financial struggles that many will face as a result of mandatory school or 
business closure for instance, will be most pronounced for low-income workers and the 
least well-off in society.  These groups will have fewer personal financial resources to 
sustain them during closures and may be at higher risk of job loss if they lack vacation or 
sick leave benefits. They may also be less able to negotiate systems to obtain information 
about how to prepare for a pandemic or respond to an outbreak, or how to access limited 
resources.  It will be a major challenge to public health officials and local community 




currently state and federal plans do little to protect against the financial consequences 
expected with sustained closures. 
A number of frameworks have been developed to assist policy makers and 
practitioners to consider the ethical implications of public health actions and to help 
determine when individual restrictions and other policy actions are justified. (Baum et al., 
2007; Gostin and Powers, 2006; Bayer and Fairchild, 2004; Nieburg et al., 2003; 
Childress et al., 2002; Callahan and Jennings, 2002; Kass, 2001.)  Common among most 
of them are considerations of: a) whether the proposed restriction on the individual is 
expected to be effective in achieving its intended goals; b) whether failing to implement 
the policy would cause greater harms; c) whether there are less restrictive options that 
could achieve the goals; and d) whether the benefits and burdens associated with the 
policy are equitably shared among community members.  Since the empirical evidence of 
the effectiveness of social distancing measures is limited, and there are potentially large 
and predictable economic and other burdens associated with these measures which are 
likely to be unequally distributed, policy makers may have a special obligation to 
consider both how to mitigate inequities and provide opportunities for public education 
and input in the policy making process.  Deliberative processes can offer individuals 
opportunities for engagement in complex issues such as these. When individuals learn 
about an issue and better understand the ways the particular issue may affect them in their 
daily lives, they can, in turn, help policy makers understand diverse points of view about, 
and likely responses to a proposed policy.  In the case of social distancing measures, 
deliberation may be an effective process to gain public insights and to gauge both the 




individuals will comply with such interventions.  For allocation policy, if members of a 
community perceive too few benefits or too many burdens will fall to them, public unrest 
may ensue.  Public deliberation before the onset of a serious pandemic may allow 
individuals to consider important details of allocation schemes (e.g., to see which groups 
are given high priority for scarce resources and to discuss the rationale behind such 
decisions). Deliberation may also create important venues for informing policy makers 
whether policies and plans are consistent with community values and conceptions of 
fairness.  
Those deliberating may or may not come to consensus on some of the more 
difficult questions, such as which population group should receive priority for scarce 
resources, but the process of deliberation may itself be useful.  It is not surprising that in 
a short, 90-minute focus group participants did not reach consensus on difficult moral 
questions.  Yet even under such limited circumstances, individual participants were able 
to share their own informed opinions and to listen to those of others.  These members of 
the public raised many issues currently discussed in the public health ethics literature 
about the various conceptions of fairness in allocation schemes, and offered a wealth of 
life experiences to illustrate their claims.  This study was designed as a pilot for a 
deliberation project that would incorporate more participants and would likely include a 
condition that groups attempt to reach consensus.  
In deliberation, affected individuals may behave as citizens, and work toward a 
goal that is perhaps larger than themselves (Abelson, 2009b; Gutmann and Thompson, 
1997).  Those holding dissenting views are encouraged to share them and, importantly, to 




encourage some to change their minds or it may simply create some common ground on 
which to base a group decision.  Gutmann and Thompson (2002) suggest that there may 
be times when individuals do not get what they want or need in a deliberative process, 
but that if the process is perceived as fair, those individuals participating in the 
deliberation can accept the collective decision as legitimate.  Even if a deliberative group 
does not come to consensus, their discourse may inform policy makers‟ decisions.  That 
is, the deliberations themselves may offer clarity and a significant depth of 
understanding.  It is important to recognize, however, that even if consensus is reached, 
even high quality democratic deliberation does not guarantee that any particular outcome 
will be right or just.  In some cases, the public may “get it wrong” and may put forth 
recommendations or make requests that are not in the community‟s best interest, are 
inconsistent with expert knowledge, or are in conflict with another important societal 
principle or with the rights of a certain group (Chamberlin, J. 2009; Dworkin, 1984).  In 
general, deliberative processes are not intended to directly set social policy, but rather to 
inform the larger policy process.  
Our participants showed a clear capacity for deliberation.  As members of the 
public, most with no health care background, they were able to discuss a complex and 
challenging public health issue, to listen to others‟ opinions and to share opposing 
viewpoints.  They identified issues and articulated concerns about the economic and other 
burdens associated with social distancing measures and resource allocation schemes that 
academics and policy makers in the U.S. and around the world recognize as important in 
pandemic planning and response.  Deliberative procedures can be employed in many 




equal individuals join together in discussion, this process may only be feasible in 
democratic societies.  To ensure that a variety of viewpoints are included, policy makers 
purposefully bring together individuals from various sectors of society, which may be a 
tall task in societies where social divisions are pronounced. 
While the broad constructs of democratic deliberation are described and supported 
by many in the literature, there is, as yet, no consensus about a particular method(s) that 
must be used to ensure an effective or productive deliberative process (Abelson, 2009b ; 
Gostin, 2009).  Our participants showed a capacity for deliberation and offered individual 
advice to policy makers, but they were not pushed to reach consensus on any one issue.  
Does this study constitute a deliberative process?   In order to learn whether deliberation 
“works,” whether it achieves better or more just outcomes, we must be clear about what 
we mean by “deliberation.”  This clarity is necessary to achieve internal validity in 
evaluation research and to accurately measure outcomes. 
  While much of the discourse we describe highlights challenges in pandemic 
response, participants also exhibited public-spirited perspectives on which to build. Most 
groups emphasized the need to maintain essential services, paralleling outcomes from one 
of the CDC‟s public engagement projects (Keystone 2007) and consistent with the 
recommendations of some scholars (Kass et al, 2008).  In a pandemic, health officials 
will need to ask citizens to comply with voluntary social distancing provisions (e.g., 
home quarantine) to minimize the use of enforcement measures.  Our participants‟ 
concern for the health of the entire community suggests that individuals could and would 
comply with policies that are challenging personally, if the community benefits are clear 




time when influenza activity was normal, and no influenza pandemic had been declared.  
In recent commentary on a portion of this study, Gostin noted that what participants 
espouse during deliberation may not reflect their true actions during a crisis (2009). 
Policymakers should heed participants‟ requests for education and opportunities for 
public input in planning processes.  If individuals feel disconnected, poorly informed, or 
without a voice in designing policies that have a direct impact on their lives, further 
distrust in government could ensue.  The current H1N1 outbreak provides opportunities 
for comparing communities with and without meaningful public input in planning 
processes. 
This study suggests numerous implications for policy makers.  Based on our 
findings, even in the face of a pandemic, social distancing measures may be challenging 
to implement and sustain due to strains on family resources and these challenges will be 
exacerbated by lack of trust in government.  The effectiveness of risk communication to 
the public during emergencies depends, in part, on the existence of public trust in 
government (Wray et al., 2006; Shore, D. 2003; Covello, V., 2003).  The participants in 
our focus groups, by and large, expressed a fundamental distrust of government.  If these 
attitudes reflect those of the broader public, it may be difficult to adequately inform 
communities about pandemic response plans and to achieve compliance with social 
distancing measures.  
Policy makers must consider incorporating mechanisms for financial support into 
response plans, particularly for the poorest sectors of society, if social distancing 
measures are likely to be sustained (Holm, 2009; Viens, 2009).  Public education and 




ensure compliance with response measures or difficult allocation schemes -- our 
participants were clear in their desire for timely and accurate information.  It will be 
particularly important for public health officials to work in conjunction with religious and 
other community leaders to execute social distancing plans effectively, without creating 
animosity that may erode compliance.  Given that many participants shared public-
spirited attitudes, emphasizing the community benefit of individual sacrifice may also be 
a successful strategy.  Policy makers must assess the public response to the current H1 N1 
influenza outbreak, in particular the burdens associated with the relatively brief social 
distancing measures that were implemented in various communities, and identify ways to 
support those who need it most.  Current planning efforts should include public dialogue 
and clear leadership from public officials to engender trust and legitimacy in potentially 
contentious pandemic response plans.    
This exploratory study is limited in scope.  Our results are based on participants 
from four different communities in one particular geographic region in Michigan. Still, 
given the scant literature on public views of social distancing and resource allocation 
during pandemics, our findings may provide public health officials with some important 
insights.  Those officials who struggle with the tensions between individual freedoms and 
public well-being and are cognizant of the risk that a pandemic could worsen existing 
societal inequities, may gain a deeper understanding of how members of the public see 
those tensions.  Additional empirical work is urgently needed to gain a clearer 
understanding of public views and willingness to abide by pandemic response plans.   
This study was designed, in part, to assess whether deliberative procedures would 




preparedness and response.  By at least some definitions, for processes to truly be 
deliberative, participants must reach consensus on the topic at hand (Abelson,2009a).  In 
our short focus group sessions we did not feel there was adequate time to push groups to 
reach consensus, either on perspectives on social distancing measures or on the bases for 
allocation decisions. Future research will extend the length of the deliberative sessions to 
allow the important process of consensus building to take place. 
To be sure, our participants‟ concerns give us pause when we think about 
implementation of social distancing measures and priority plans.  Yet we have learned 
lessons from other recent public health emergencies that the lack of appropriate public 
health response can result in significant community burdens and unwanted consequences.  
The process of resolving ethical issues inherent in planning for and responding to a 
pandemic may benefit from public engagement and deliberation.  Democratic 
deliberation may serve as an effective catalyst in the process of resolving ethical 
challenges in pandemic preparedness, especially if such processes can be shown to 
increase transparency, gauge community support for proposed interventions, and provide 
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Table 4.1:    Participant Characteristics, n=37 
 
Characteristic Value 
Median age† 43yrs 
Women 73% 
Employed 81% 
Parenting young children 51% 
Health care workers† 15% 
Race†  
African American 25% 
Caucasian 72% 
American Indian 3% 




High school 9% 
Some college 38% 
Bachelor‟s degree 38% 
Master‟s degree or more 16% 
Insured at time of focus group† 84% 
Uninsured within last year† 25% 
† n=32 
 
Participants self-identified race and chose all that applied from: 
African American, Caucasian, American Indian, Native 




APPENDIX 4.A      DISCUSSION PROTOCOL 
 
Ethical Issues in Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: 
Focus Groups for Public Engagement 
 
 
1. Introduction by Facilitator (5 min) 
a. Explanation of the purpose of group session – Joy Calloway  
b. Informed consent and description of use of data – Nancy  
 
2. Opening questions to engage the group - Joy (10 min) 
a. How long have you lived in the county?  Have you ever experienced a 
widespread emergency or other situation during which your community 
had to work together to solve a problem? 
b. Before coming to this focus group, what were your thoughts about the 
possibility of a flu pandemic and its ramifications? 
 
3. Briefing on Pandemic – Nancy (10 min) 
a. Facts about pan flu, definitions of key terms (e.g., quarantine), brief 
history of past pandemics.  Although pandemic may not be prominent in 
the news in recent months, it remains a very real threat 
b. Description of expected impact of disease on the community, excess 
demand on health care system and expected public health response  
c. Description of limitations in public health response (e.g., too few 
antivirals and ventilators, lag time to develop and distribute vaccine) and 
expected non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing 
measures) 
d. Some problems not easily solved by the law or by science.  What “should” 
this community do in response to a flu pandemic? 
  
4. Discussion re: willingness to accept social distancing measures – Joy (30 min) 
a. Would you support the closing of schools and daycare centers before the 
pandemic strikes [your community]? Before it strikes Michigan?  Why or 
why not?  Would you support the closing of worksites? Of religious 
organization meetings?   
b. Would you support school closings for a sustained period of time (e.g. 
three weeks) Why or why not? 
c. Would you support encouraging those who have been exposed to the flu 
but who are not yet sick to stay home from work and school?  Why or why 
not? 
d. Would you support quarantine or travel restrictions for those exposed to 
the flu?  Why or why not? 
e. What is your advice to policy makers? 
 
5. Discussion re: acceptance of processes that may be employed to allocate scarce 




a. On what basis should we decide who should receive the limited antiviral 
medications or ventilators during a pandemic? 
b. Should limited vaccine supply (or antiviral medication) be given first to 
those most likely to die from (or be hospitalized because of) a flu 
pandemic, or should it be given first to those with jobs that are essential to 
keep society functioning (e.g., those who make vaccines, maintain public 
safety, run the utility companies, key government leaders, others?)  Please 
discuss your reasoning. 
c. What is your advice to policy makers about how to manage scarce 
resources during a pandemic? 
 
6. Wrap-up – Nancy (5 min) 
a. Final thoughts – Now that we‟ve had this discussion, have your thoughts 









What is pandemic flu? 
 A global outbreak of a strain of the flu that causes serious illness 
 Easily transmitted from person to person, with little or no 
immunity in the population   
 Previous pandemics in 1918, 1957 and 1968 
 Related terms: “bird flu,” “avian influenza,” and “H5N1 flu”  
 
Why are we worried about pandemic flu now? 
 Today, there is no flu pandemic.  However, experts predict we 
may experience a pandemic sometime soon. 
 Ease of worldwide transmission today 
 There have been hundreds of human cases of avian flu, mainly 
in the developing world, where resources for surveillance and 
response are limited 
 No vaccine is commercially available.  Once a flu strain is 
identified it takes many months to produce a vaccine 
 
What will happen if/when a pandemic strikes? 
 Exact impact is unknown, but many people in many places would 
become sick at the same time.  Impact depends on severity of 
the virus and societal ability to reduce the spread of the disease 
and to treat those who become sick  
 Many people would have to stay home from work, either because 
they are sick or to care for family members who are sick  
 Schools, pre-schools and many businesses and religious 
organizations would have to close for a long period of time, 
perhaps many weeks   
 Multiple waves of infection (6-8 weeks) through the community 
 Travel restrictions   
 Quarantine or isolation 
 
What problems will we face? 
 Social and economic disruption in schools, workplaces, daycare 
or religious settings may last for many weeks.  Individuals may 
not be prepared to remain in their homes for extended periods 
 Health care systems will be overloaded.  Death rates will be 
high.  A large proportion of the population will need medical 
care, with large numbers needing to be hospitalized.  Medical 




not be able to meet the demand.  Fewer health care personnel 
will be available because they, too will be sick or needed at 
home to care for sick family members 
 It will take many months to develop a vaccine for the particular 
flu virus and there will be limited supply early in production.  
Antiviral medications may be in short supply and may not be 
effective against particular virus.  Difficult decisions will need to 
be made about who gets the limited supplies of vaccine, antiviral 
medications, ventilators and other scarce items. 
  
  





Contact information for Principal Investigator: Peter D. Jacobson, JD, 
MPH 
734/936-0928 or pdj@umich.edu 
 
Contact information for Co-Investigator: Nancy M. Baum, MHS 















APPENDIX 4.C        CODEBOOK  
 




1. Initial impressions/thoughts OR text later in discussion that applies directly to 
these codes 
a. Generalized fear 
i. Fear of contagion 
b. Worries about unequal treatment 
i. b/c of insurance status 
ii. b/c of $; ability to bribe 
iii. b/c of race 
iv. b/c of social worth 
v. b/c unable to care for self; vulnerable pops 
c. Fear of losing job 
i. b/c stay home to care for others 
ii. b/c exposed or sick 
d. Fear of inability to adequately prepare 
e. Concern for self 
f. Other 
2. Social distancing issues 
a. School closure 
i. Schools vectors for spreading disease 
ii. Children will be left home unattended b/c parents must work; 
safety issues 
iii. Many will keep kids home even if schools not closed 
iv. Need a “real” reason to close schools; 
1. Threat is imminent 
2. Will cause great economic impact 
v. Teens may not comply 
vi. Good epidemiology & disease tracking instead of school closure 
b. Business closure 
i. Long term effects on the economy 
ii. Must maintain infrastructure; certain businesses must not close 
iii. Economic hardship too great if shut down too long; too early; 
iv. Impact may not be severe for certain businesses or industries 
c. Religious institution closure 
i. People need religious institutions during times of crisis 
ii. People should be free to or have right to gather and worship 
together 
iii. Leave it up to individual religious institutions to decide when or if 
to close; 
iv. Closure creates economic hardship for religious institutions 




d. Travel restrictions/quarantine 
i. Government boundaries such as county lines do not hold – school 
districts different from county lines 
ii. Desire to keep people “out” (e.g., of Michigan; of own county) 
iii. Quarantine should be voluntary; freedom most important 
iv. Quarantine may help control fear & chaos 
v. Quarantine can have serious limitations; concerns about meeting 
basic needs 
vi. Enforcement of quarantine difficult 
vii. Difficult to know when to apply b/c don‟t know who has been 
exposed 
e. Motivation or justification for invoking social distancing measures 
i. Depends on how “severe” the virus is 
ii. Depends on how imminent the threat is 
f. Other 
3. Setting priorities for allocating scarce resources (vaccine; antiviral medication; 
ventilators) 
a. Priority to children 
i. Because they haven‟t lived as many years yet 
b. Priority to caregivers 
c. Priority to health care workers 
d. Priority to vulnerable populations 
i. Homebound 
ii. Chronically ill 
e. Priority to first responders/police 
f. Priority to those who maintain infrastructure or have important social role 
g. Priority to those who will benefit most 
h. Priority by lottery 
i. Priority by first come first served 
j. Priority by most likely to survive 
k. Priority to most valuable to society 
l. Lower priority for prisoners & criminals 





1. Distrust of Government 
a. Politicians will do what is politically expedient, not stick to plan 
b. Those stockpiling/making vaccine will take what they want 
c. No public policy can protect against influence of $ 
d. Policy makers & politicians should be selfless 
e. Involve others (e.g., health care workers, scientists) in planning 
f. Politicians & government workers may give the populace false 
information 




2. Importance of educating the public 
a. Media messages must be coordinated and clear 
i. Because public will be more compliant 
ii. Because it will prevent panic 
b. Public deserves to be informed 
c. Other 
3. Importance of public input 
4. Community-mindedness (“public spirited”) 
a. People will do what is right to reduce spread of disease 
b. Individuals have duty not to infect others 
c. Plan based on science, not popularity, for common good 
d. Lack of community-mindedness; self-interests first 
5. Need/desire for fairness in allocation schemes 
a. Desire not to exacerbate existing social inequalities 
b. Fairness ensures compliance 
c. Other references to fairness 
6. Recognition of complexity/difficulty in planning and response 
a. Importance of enforcing & sticking to a plan without influence from 
interest groups 
b. Fear that plan and response will not be adequate or effective 
c. Money will not or may not be adequate to address need 
d. Complexity requires coordination 
e. International interdependence 
7. Role for supportive therapy 
8. Policy suggestions/creative solutions 
a. Politicians and health care systems need to be prepared; stockpile 
b. Plans should be flexible to accommodate unforeseen circumstances 
c. Plan now to substitute on-line learning during school closure 
d. Educate the public now; use “drills”; train volunteers 
e. Safeguard jobs 
f. Other 
9. Good quote 
a. Section 1 
b. Section 2 
c. Section 3 
d. Section 4 
e. Section 5 
f. Section 6 
g. Section 7 
h. Section 8 
i. Section 9 
j. Section 10 














Through qualitative and quantitative research methods, this dissertation 
contributes to the field of public health systems research by increasing the knowledge 
base about resource allocation in public health practice.  Using data from two national 
surveys, we analyze the types of allocation decisions local health officials (LHOs) make, 
the factors that influence those decisions, and the role that discretion plays in allocation 
decisions.  We also employ focus group data to assess public deliberations about 
pandemic response policies.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Survey results in Chapter 2 indicate that  most LHOs do not shift resources among 
population groups, but they do alter the tasks their staffs perform, allowing them to 
emphasize certain activities or services.  Factors that heavily influence allocation 
decisions include: the effectiveness of an activity or service; status as the sole provider of 
a service; previous budgets; input from a Board of Health; and reluctance to lay off staff.  
In contrast, the least influential factors in allocation decisions include decision tools or 
economic analyses, direct public input, needs assessments and input from colleagues in 




Findings that LHOs do not shift resources among population groups are consistent 
with LHOs‟ concerns that they have little flexibility to reallocate program funds.  When 
making allocation decisions, effectiveness is reported as the most influential factor, yet it 
is not clear that LHOs have access to adequate effectiveness data on which to base 
allocation decisions.  In addition, ensuring access to services has long been a priority for 
local public health, making it difficult to end funding for a service if the health 
department is the sole provider in a community.  Reliance on previous budget schemes 
does not encourage a re-examination of priorities or a determination of whether an 
allocation plan is consistent with current public health goals.   
Officials may rely less on decision tools or economic analyses during allocation 
because their departments lack the necessary expertise to use them, or because they may 
not see existing tools as useful or appropriate.  Despite the fact that assessment is a core 
function of public health, this foundational activity is generally not being conducted in 
conjunction with allocation decision making.       
As discussed in Chapter 3, officials reported that they can reallocate nearly one-
third of all department revenues and nearly half of all personnel time at their discretion.  
Sixty-five percent reported a “great deal” or “complete” control in allocation decisions.  
These levels did not vary significantly by the size of the health department.  Levels of 
discretion did vary, however, by governance structure, with officials from locally 
governed departments reporting significantly higher discretion than those from state 
governed departments.  Contrary to our hypothesis, officials running departments with 
higher proportions of revenues from local sources did not report significantly higher 




revenues from local sources, and officials in locally governed departments report higher 
discretion, further research focused on the relationship between discretion and funding 
sources should be pursued.   
Multivariable analyses indicate that in the absence of a Board of Health, higher 
per capita expenditures are associated with lower discretion.  This may be because 
departments draw revenues from funding sources readily available to them, but such 
funding may be earmarked for specific populations or services and not directly tailored to 
community needs.  In the presence of a Board of Health, however, such expenditures are 
associated with higher discretion.  This  indicates that Boards may be effective in 
ensuring adequate and appropriate funding specific to communities‟ needs, reducing the 
need to seek extra funding.  
Bivariate analyses  indicate a positive association between increased discretion 
and decreased unmet need for ten specific public health services.  It will be important to 
conduct more nuanced analyses of the relationship between discretion and capacity to 
meet community public health needs, and to assess the ways that officials operationalize 
discretion in their daily work. 
In Chapter 4 deliberative groups addressed issues of fairness and equity in the 
distribution of scarce resources as well as burdens and benefits associated with social 
distancing measures during a pandemic.  None of the groups reached a consensus about 
which populations should have priority or one guiding principle that should drive 
allocation decisions.  Each emphasized fairness and invoked utilitarian and egalitarian 
justifications for allocation.  Some also argued for priority to the most vulnerable or made 




Discussions of social distancing measures raised fears about economic burdens 
associated with job and school closure, as well as concerns about lack of freedom and 
loss of support during closure of religious institutions.  Participants emphasized that 
threat of infection must be imminent before closures would be justified.  Broad themes 
addressed in discussions of both allocation and social distancing included distrust of 
government, public-spirited attitudes and desire for public involvement in policy 
processes.  The data from these groups suggests that even in the face of a pandemic, 
social distancing measures and allocation schemes may be challenging to implement and 
sustain due to strains on family resources and distrust of government.   
Participants with differing viewpoints demonstrated a clear capacity for 
deliberating about difficult policy issues, listened to others‟ perspectives, and may have 
influenced others‟ positions.  They addressed complex issues associated with the 
distribution of benefits and burdens associated with public health policies, as well as the 
need to balance demands for personal autonomy with community well-being.  
Opportunities such as these for public education and input in policy processes may be 
important to build trust and ensure compliance. 
 
Contributions and Policy Implications 
Taken together, the findings from these two studies suggest numerous 
implications for policy makers.  First, both studies highlight the need to focus efforts on 
producing evidence of effectiveness in public health services and activities.  Officials 
value the use of empirical evidence to support their allocation decisions, and policy 




current effectiveness data is very limited.   Policy makers must support expansion of 
effectiveness research, as well as translation and dissemination of that research, so that 
LHOs can improve the health status of communities by offering programs that work.  
LHOs rely heavily on past allocation schemes to guide future allocation decisions, and 
there is certainly some efficiency in that approach, but evidence of effectiveness is 
required to know whether past approaches to allocation are worth perpetuating.  As an 
example from pandemic preparedness and response, the dearth of evidence on the 
effectiveness of social distancing measures, coupled with little public trust in 
government, could seriously undermine public health efforts to contain contagion in 
communities. 
Similarly, our findings indicate that conducting needs assessments is not a part of 
most LHOs‟ current allocation decision processes.  Such assessment is a core function of 
public health practice, and assessment data is vital for matching allocation decisions to 
community needs.  Policy makers should, therefore also support and encourage the use of 
needs assessments prior to allocation decision making so that priority is given to 
populations or programs with the greatest needs.   
Additionally, the ability of researchers to learn more about resource allocation and 
other aspects of the public health system depends on the availability of accurate and 
complete revenue and expenditure data from LHDs.  Many LHDs currently do not have 
the capacity to accurately collect and report such data.  Therefore, policy makers should 
also invest in developing and making available more effective, user-friendly data 
collection tools and accounting methods for LHDs.  State health departments could play 




directly from the state to LHDs, and for the federal resources passed through states to 
LHDs.   
Our findings also suggest that LHOs‟ discretion may be influenced by factors 
beyond the mix of revenue sources.   This finding offers a new perspective on the 
positive role that Boards of Health may play in assuring that LHDs have adequate and 
appropriate resources to address local community needs.  Further studies should examine 
operational features of Boards of Health and further delineate aspects of the relationships 
between Boards of Health and LHOs that may affect revenues and programming.   
The association we have identified between increased discretion in allocation 
decisions and increased capacity for meeting community public health needs is 
particularly intriguing, given that some LHOs suggest they could do more with the 
resources already in the system if they had more discretion.  Further research should 
focus on developing an understanding of the ways that discretion is operationalized, and 
how factors that increase discretion may also influence the capacity for meeting 
community needs.  For example, a future research question might be: are LHOs with 
higher discretion designing new programs or creating more successful partnerships with 
community providers than those with lower discretion?    
Numerous potential policy implications arise from the findings of the focus group 
study described in Chapter 4.  If our participants‟ concerns about the economic and 
emotional burdens associated with pandemic response plans are broadly shared, it may be 
difficult to implement and sustain social distancing measures in communities.  Rigorous 
analysis of community experiences with the current H1N1 pandemic should inform future 




against the economic and emotional burdens they create.  Contingency plans may be 
needed to manage the desire for religious support and the need for economic resources 
for vulnerable populations (e.g., the working poor with inadequate sick leave benefits and 
single parent families with young children).   
Our participants clearly wanted accurate and consistent information and 
opportunities for input and discussion.  Policy makers should not shy away from 
involving the public, particularly in value-laden decisions such as allocation plans for 
scarce resources during an emergency.   Public deliberation about pandemic response or 
other pressing policy issues can create important venues for informing policy makers and 
LHOs about whether policies parallel community values and conceptions of fairness.  
Many participants made public-spirited comments and suggested that they 
appreciated the complexity of allocation decisions.  If the broader public also has this 
ability to engage in fairly sophisticated, nuanced discussions of complex issues, policy 
makers should consider that public input may be another significant source of 
information to assist them in making critical decisions.  If engaging the public in dialogue 
can clarify community benefits, make allocation decisions more transparent, and offer 
policy makers meaningful information about diverse points of view, such engagement 
may go a long way toward improving pandemic response and other response plans.  
Public engagement may be particularly useful in helping LHDs to educate their 
communities, show transparency in policies and build trust when faced with scarcity of 
vital resources.  Larger studies are necessary to develop more generalizeable findings.  
Future research should also emphasize the development of standards for deliberation so 
that deliberative processes can be rigorously assessed for effectiveness. 
